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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
A BEHAVIOR BASED APPROACH TO VIRUS DETECTION
by
Jose Andre Morales
Florida International University, 2008
Miami, Florida
Professor Peter J. Clarke, Co-Major Professor
Professor Yi Deng, Co-Major Professor
Fast spreading unknown viruses have caused major damage on computer sys-
tems upon their initial release. Current detection methods have lacked capabilities
to detect unknown viruses quickly enough to avoid mass spreading and damage.
This dissertation has presented a behavior based approach to detecting known and
unknown viruses based on their attempt to replicate. Replication is the qualify-
ing fundamental characteristic of a virus and is consistently present in all viruses
making this approach applicable to viruses belonging to many classes and executing
under several conditions. A form of replication called self-reference replication, (SR-
replication), has been formalized as one main type of replication which specifically
replicates by modifying or creating other files on a system to include the virus itself.
This replication type was used to detect viruses attempting replication by referencing
themselves which is a necessary step to successfully replicate files. The approach does
not require a priori knowledge about known viruses. Detection was accomplished at
runtime by monitoring currently executing processes attempting to replicate. Two
implementation prototypes of the detection approach called SRRAT were created
and tested on the Microsoft Windows operating systems focusing on the tracking of
user mode Win32 API system calls and Kernel mode system services. The research
results showed SR-replication capable of distinguishing between file infecting viruses
and benign processes with little or no false positives and false negatives.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The dominance of networked computers and wide spread use of wireless devices has
created a new fertile ground for novel creation and release of destructive, highly infec-
tious, fast spreading computer viruses. Robust virus detection is essential to protect
against these new unknown threats. Current virus detection technology though very
effective in detecting previously discovered viruses, falls short of providing effective
detection against just released unknown viruses. The main reason of this ineffec-
tiveness against unknown viruses is the high dependence of a signature database as
the centerpiece of detection for current virus detectors. Using a signature database
only allows for detection of previously discovered viruses but fails in the detection of
unknown viruses. A previously discovered virus has been isolated and examined by
virus researches. A signature which is a unique string of bytes uniquely identifying a
particular virus is extracted from the executable version of the virus and added to the
database. If the virus evolves in some form that alters the portion of its executable
form pertaining to the signature, detection of the evolved version of the virus may fail.
Behavior based virus detection is a promising approach capable of detecting un-
known viruses. This form of virus detection does not use a signature database. Instead
executing processes are monitored and their behavior is analyzed. If the execution
behavior of a process exhibits virus behavior then the process can be flagged as be-
ing a possible virus. Virus behavior is predefined by the behavior based detection
approach that is being implemented and is usually done by a knowledge expert in
computer viruses. The main problem of behavior based virus detection is defining a
virus behavior that assures the detection of both known and unknown viruses while
not incorrectly detect benign processes as being a virus. The result of this diffi-
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culty is several behavior based virus detection approaches define virus behavior that
successfully detect viruses and not benign processes only under stringent execution
conditions. Other behavior based detection approaches define virus behavior that suc-
cessfully detect only a specific class of virus. All of these behavior based approaches
are built upon some characteristic of a virus that is identifiable only under specific
execution conditions or in a specific class of virus. To be more effective, these behav-
ior based detectors should be based upon a virus characteristic that is consistently
present in all viruses. This can facilitate successful detection of both known and
unknown viruses belonging to several classes and under several execution conditions.
One goal of this research is to identify a characteristic of computer viruses that is
consistently present in all viruses and create an effective and robust behavior based
virus detection approach that is based on that characteristic.
The seminal research formally defining a computer virus show the qualifying fun-
damental characteristic of a virus to be replication. When a malicious code is classified
as a virus, it is done so only after assuring the malicious code has the ability to repli-
cate. Replication is the main characteristic that differentiates a computer virus form
other forms of malicious code. This makes replication the fundamental qualifying
characteristic of a virus, thus every virus is guaranteed to have the ability to repli-
cate. The implication of this is that replication is the one characteristic of a virus
that is consistently present in all viruses regardless of what class the virus belongs
to and regardless of under what execution conditions the virus will run. This makes
replication an excellent virus characteristic that can be used to build an effective and
robust virus detection approach. The virus detection approach presented in this re-
search is based on virus replication.
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A virus will execute a series of operations during its replication process. Having
the ability to replicate does not guarantee a virus will successfully replicate every time
it executes. A virus may not even attempt replication for several different reasons.
When a virus does attempt replication, there is one property of this process that is
almost always present. This property is implied in the following observation: “When
a virus replicates, what is it replicating?”, the answer is “itself”. This observation
implies an essential part of the replication process which is when a virus attempts to
replicate itself it must refer to itself as the source of the replication. The act of a virus
referring to itself in order to replicate is an essential property of virus replication. In
this research we define this property to be the self-reference property (SR). When
a virus attempts a replication where SR is present, we define that specific form of
replication as self-reference replication (SR-replication).
In this research the term “itself” refers to the static image of the virus file saved
on a storage device such as a hard drive. When a virus replicates it may do so in one
of three general ways: it may copy itself into an already existing file, it may create a
new file containing a copy of itself or it may copy itself into a memory location and
continue execution from there. The first two types are part of a general class of viruses
titled file infector viruses, the last type belongs to a virus class titled memory resident
viruses. There are many known viruses that are strictly memory resident viruses, but
they are outnumbered by the far larger class of file infector viruses. There are also
several hybrid viruses that replicate as both file infector and memory resident. The
vast majority of known viruses are either strictly or partially file infector viruses.
Another important aspect of virus replication is the desired destination, normally
this is one of two places: the local computer where the virus is saved or executing
from, or another computer across a network, where the network can be wired or wire-
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less. A subtype of the virus called a worm is designed to replicate across networks,
many classes exist for worms such as peer-to-peer worms, network worms and email
worms. One of the goals of a worm is to replicate from one computer to another, but
in many cases they will first replicate on the local computer to then attempt replica-
tion across a network to another computer. Most of the known worms replicate both
on a local computer and across networks with a smaller number strictly replicating
across networks. Viruses can spread via replication across computers and networks
either slowly or very fast. Many new viruses have been termed fast spreading, these
types of viruses such as Warhol worms and Fast worms can spread to over 90% of
vulnerable computers in as little as 15 seconds. It is difficult to determine how many
times a virus will attempt to replicate on a local computer. Static analysis of a virus
could provide evidence hinting toward high or low frequency of replication attempts.
Unfortunately in the case of fast spreading viruses, static analysis is not an option
when immediate detection is of utmost importance.
This research is to develop a detection approach for file infector viruses attempting
SR-replication on a local computer. An assumption is made that SR-replication is a
behavior belonging to computer viruses and is unlikely to occur in benign processes.
The goal of the detection approach is to stop the proliferation of known and unknown
fast and slow spreading viruses on a local machine by terminating them upon identi-
fying their first attempt to replicate using SR-replication where the virus can belong
to one of many classes and can execute under several different conditions.
1.1 Motivation
Effective detection of unknown viruses upon first release is one of the biggest chal-
lenges facing computer virus researchers today. A study from 2006 showed that virus
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companies required on average 6 hours to analyze and extract a signature from a
newly discovered virus and add it to their signature database [56]. This was the
same amount of time needed by these companies two years earlier in 2004 [8]. Dur-
ing the same two year period several fast spreading destructive viruses most notably
the Witty worm [49] have emerged in the wild causing several millions of dollars in
damages. In 2006, an FBI survey reported computer viruses as the number one cause
of financial loss for American companies [28]. At over $67 billion dollars, viruses
accounted for over 70% of all financial losses for the corporations surveyed. For the
same year Kaspersky Labs reported a strong rise in the number of new viruses and
more momentum in the second half of the year with email worms topping the list
[4]. Kaspersky also forecasts that viruses will increasingly appear, helping to spread
other forms of malware and use more sophisticated techniques to avoid detection.
Virus writers are also being well funded by rogue governments and organzied crime,
allowing the development of cutting edge detection avoidance and fast distribution
techniques.
Despite this growing problem antivirus companies continue to use signature databases
as their primary tool for virus detection. In 2006 Kaspersky labs averaged 10,000 new
record updates to its signature database per month and 200 new malware samples
per day [16]. Even after solutions have been released it is unknown how much time
passes until all end user signature databases are updated. It is clear that antivirus
companies will continue to improperly and slowly handle the ever growing virus prob-
lem using signature databases as the centerpiece of detection. The future outlook and
forecast trends show viruses to be increasing and working closely with other forms of
malware continuing to injure and infect computers world wide [3, 2]. In early 2008,
the assistant secretary for cyber security and telecommunications at the Department
of Homeland Security Gregory Garcia renewed the department’s determination to
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create a secure cyberspace citing the exponential growth of connected devices as a
breeding ground of future attacks [32]. The history and future outlook of computer
viruses on the global community along with the inadequate performance of current
virus detection technologies serves has motivation for this research.
1.2 Research Problem
The research presented in [38, 5] demonstrated the inability of current signature based
virus detectors to detect obfuscated versions of known viruses. This inability leaves
computers susceptible to infection by unknown viruses. Currently, very few behavior
based detection approaches are available and widely used as a main form of virus
detection by companies and consumers. The central problem investigated by this
research is the ability to find a characteristic of viruses that can be used to detect file
infecting computer viruses when they first attempt replication in a local computer and
can a differentiation be established between viruses and benign processes based on this
characteristic. A second problem investigated by this research is the effectiveness of
a behavior based virus detector using this characteristic as its main form of detection
in stopping or minimizing the replication of both known and unknown file infecting
viruses executing in a local computer with minimal false positives and false negatives.
1.3 Proposed Solution
In an attempt to solution the first research problem, SR-replication will be used as the
main point of distinguishing between viruses and benign processes. By establishing
this distinction the rate of false positives and false negatives between viruses and
benign processes can be kept to a minimum. The second research problem will be
addressed through the creation of an SR-replication based virus detector prototype
that can be executed on a local computer to monitor processes as a real-time monitor.
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When a process exhibits SR-replication behavior, that process is flagged as exhibiting
possible virus behavior. The following assumptions are made for this solution:
1. SR-replication is a characteristic unique to virus and not observed in benign
processes.
2. The prototype will only detect file infecting viruses which replicate using SR
on a local computer.
To test the proposed solution, static analysis of known viruses will be conducted to
analyze the presence of SR-replication. This analysis will also be conducted on benign
processes to confirm our assumption by verifying the absence of of SR-replication in
these non-viral processes. The prototype will be executed on a virtual machine and
a real computer for several days to test for false positive production. The prototype
will also be tested against a set of SR-replicating file infecting viruses to test for
accurate detection and virus process termination plus the absence of false negative
production. The effectiveness and resource usage of the prototype will be determined
based on a several day test on a real computer with the goal being an establishment
of non-overwhelming usage of system resources allowing the system to function in a
normal manner while the detector is in use.
1.4 Novel Contributions
This research establishes three novel contributions in the area of computer virus
detection, they are as follows:
1. Creation of a new virus detection approach using SR-replication.
2. Identification of known and unknown file infecting viruses with no a priori
knowledge of known viruses using this approach that produces minimal false
positives and false negatives.
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3. A behavior based virus detector implementing the approach that is effectively
used in a real time environment without significant system slowdown.
Up to this point there have been several behavior based approaches to virus de-
tection. Many of these detection approaches use a specific characteristic of viruses
for their detection methodology that is not consistently found in all viruses [39].
The result is detection limited to specific classes of viruses or under specific con-
ditions. In this research I characterize a specific form of virus replication which is
the fundamental virus characteristic present in all viruses. Establishing replication
as a characteristic that is fundamental and present in all viruses makes it a perfect
research area for new detection approaches. The benefit of a consistent characteristic
is the the ability to rely upon it when creating detection algorithms. The reliability
allows for the algorithms to possibly be very effective in detecting viruses belonging
to several different classes and under many different execution conditions.
The ability of having one characteristic that identifies both known and unknown
viruses with no a priori knowledge is a powerful step forward in the field of virus
detection. The fact that this one characteristic also produces minimal false positives
and false negatives makes it very appealing as a standalone implementation for detec-
tion in real time or as a component working with other establish detection methods
resulting in in a more robust virus detection solution. A standalone implementation
can consume minimal resources of the system and perform silently in the background
this is ideal for home users. As one component of a bigger solution it is key for enter-
prises with a wealth of computer resources and are inclined to protect every vector
of their system from a possible computer virus attack.
The principle benefit of a virus detector based on SR-replication is its ability to
detect a virus replication upon its initial replication attempt in a computer system.
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Many of the viruses released in recent history have been fast spreading viruses. These
infect and injure a vast majority of susceptible computers in under 3 hours from
initial release. A detector using SR-replication may be able to thwart some of this
fast spreading by identifying the virus’s replication behavior in a local computer and
terminate it. Thus stopping that virus’s proliferation into other computers across a
system.
1.5 Scope and Limitations
There are two main forms of virus replication, the first is by infecting already existing
files and creating new files containing a copy of the virus and the second is by creating
a copy of the virus in memory. In its current form SR-replication will only detect
viruses replicating by infecting existing files or creating new files which contain a copy
of the virus. Viruses that replicate by creating a copy strictly in memory will not be
detected. Besides replication, a virus also injures a computer in one or several dif-
ferent ways. SR-replication is designed to only detect the replication aspect of a virus.
If a virus injures and causes damage to a computer and never replicates it will not
be detected by my approach in its current form. Also if a virus injures and causes
damage to a computer before replicating it will not be detected until the replication
commences, therefore any damaged incurred on a computer by a virus before repli-
cation can not be stopped or minimized by my approach. SR-replication is most
effective in stopping or minimizing replication and damage from viruses that attempt
replication when first executed or very early on in their execution.
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In its current form SR-replication is designed to detect viruses replicating in a
local computer and does not detect replication across a network from one computer
to another. It will not detect viruses that strictly replicate across a network without
ever attempting replication on a local computer at some point during its execution.
Viruses that replicate without SR will not be detected by my approach in its
current form. It is possible for a virus to replicate itself by copying itself from some
other location that already contains a copy of the virus. I define this form of replica-
tion as indirect self-reference replication (ISR-replication). This form of replication
has been identified as part of the replication process of some viruses, for example the
Anarch email worm and the Rega network worm [6, 46], but it is not commonly used
by the vast majority of known viruses.
A prototype of SR-replication will have different levels of effectiveness depending
on the specific layer of the operating system that is chosen as the target of the
implementation. If a prototype is created at a user level it may have a smaller
detection rate than a prototype implemented at a lower level, for example the kernel
level. This results from the fact that viruses are designed to avoid detection as
much as possible and very few may actually run at user level. The vast majority of
viruses attempt to run at the kernel level or lower in an attempt to subvert higher
level security measures that do not have privileged access to the lower levels of the
operating system.
1.6 Outline of the Dissertation
The balance of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 will provide background
and related work, Chapter 3 presents the theoretical foundation for SR-replication,
Chapter 4 is a description of the implementation prototypes used in this research,
10
Chapter 5 details the prototype experiments, Chapter 6 gives an analysis of testing
results and Chapter 7 consists of conclusion and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Background
Society has been dealing with computer viruses since the early 1980’s [44]. During this
time over 70,000 viruses have been discovered in the wild and the number continues
to grow. Understanding computer viruses is a never ending task that is necessarily
part of being a computer virus researcher in order to keep up with detection of
the latest virus writer techniques. The evolution of viruses in this time period has
been extraordinary with the development of almost foolproof detection avoidance
techniques, fast spreading distributions, innovative injure and infection strategies and
novel approaches of attacking vulnerable computers. In this chapter I will start with
some basic definitions then present background information on computer viruses and
detection focusing on theoretical foundations along with different classifications of
virus types, different forms of file infection strategies and virus evolution techniques.
An overview of file system operations and Windows API system calls, which are used
in the implementation prototypes will also be given. Related work to this research
will also be presented along with the betterments of this research in comparison to
these noted works.
2.1.1 Basic Definitions
1. Malware: a portmanteau of the words Malicious and Software, is defined as
software that is created to injure and/or infect a computer system without the
express consent of the computer’s owner. Malware has several subcategories
including: viruses, worms, trojan horses, logic bombs, mass-mailers, germs,
exploits, downloaders, dialers, droppers, flooders, rootkits, adware and spyware
amongst others.
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2. Virus: a program that infects other programs by modifying them to include a
possibly evolved version of itself.
3. Worm: a specific form of a virus designed to replicate across networks.
4. Trojan Horse: a program attempting to appear as a legitimate benign program
that once executed performs benign actions while covertly performing malicious
actions.
5. False Positive: A condition that arises when a benign object is classified as a
malware.
6. False Negative: A condition that arises when a malware is not identified and
classified as benign.
2.1.2 Computer Viruses
One of the early works on computer security threats is presented in [31]. Anderson
presents a definition for a threat as being a potential possibility of a deliberate and
unauthorized attempt to access or manipulate information or render a system unre-
liable or unusable. He defines vulnerability as a hardware or software flaw that can
lead to accidental disclosure of information. An attack is a planned execution of a
threat and a penetration is a successful attack. Anderson describes how surveillance
of users activity, via log records, on a system can identify computer threats. He de-
fines external and internal penetrations giving different levels or rings or security to
protect data from being penetrated. Three types of users are defined for detecting
internal penetration: 1. the masquerader, 2. the legitimate user, 3. the clandestine
user.
The masquerader is seen as the easiest to detect by identifying abnormalities in
time of computer use, frequency of use, amount of data access and which data was
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attempted to be accessed. Since the legitimate user is authorized to use the system,
abnormal usage patterns become harder to detect. Anderson claims that abnormal-
ities in totals of time of computer use, data access, attempts to access unauthorized
data would need to be analyzed to detect the misfeasance of a legitimate user. The
clandestine user is argued as the most difficult to detect assuming that administrative
rights have been acquired. This allows for activities that may not be recorded by log
records. Also the ability to erase/overwrite/deactivate log records may be available
within the privileges. Anderson presents a surveillance system that includes file mon-
itoring, user monitoring and device monitoring all based on analysis of log records
and analyzing for abnormalities in time, frequency, access and other parameters. The
definitions of threat, vulnerability, attack and penetration given by Anderson is em-
bodied in the currently accepted definition for malware [62]. His methods of detecting
attacks and penetrations by analyzing log records is seen in the publications of others
including those dealing with intrusion detection [47, 12, 45]
A computer virus is defined as a program that can infect other programs by mod-
ifying them to include a possibly evolved version of itself [22]. The key characteristic
of a virus is its ability to replicate. A virus must replicate either by infecting other
files or producing possibly evolved copies of itself. A mailicious program that does
not replicate can not be classified as a virus. Computer viruses have become very
sophisticated in detection avoidance, fast spreading and causing damage. A highly
populated taxonomy of viruses exists with each classification having its own chal-
lenges for successful detection and removal [14, 44]. Today viruses are regarded as
a real global threat and viewed as a weapon usable by those bent on creating large
scale interruption of everyday life [11, 48].
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The concept of self-replication was considered by John Von Neumann and Arthur
Burks [29, 61]. Their works based on cellular automata essentially proved the replica-
tion property can be realized. Though virus replication was not explicitly addressed
in their work it laid foundation for future seminal papers on viruses. The automata
produced were very complex, others produced less complex self reproducing automata
and can be found in [18, 10, 27, 40]. In 1938, Kleen published the Recursion Theorem
[50]. This is considered the very first formalism of a self reproducing program. The
theory proves the existence of viral programs through the use of recursive functions.
The theorem also describes what is later to be called polymorphic viruses.
Thompson presents in [57] a method of showing how a trusted program can in
fact abuse that trust by creating self reproducing programs that are deemed to be
benign along with creating other trusted programs that are in reality Trojan Horses.
Thompson creates a C compiler that is modified to purposely create malicious ver-
sions of itself. This is accomplished by knowing when it is compiling a new version
of itself at which point the malicious code is implanted. This new version of the C
compiler will forever create malicious versions of itself and other C compilers every
time they are compiled using the malicious compiler. Thompson also shows how the
compiler can implant a Trojan horse in other programs by identifying them at com-
pilation time. The point is illustrated with the Unix login program that is implanted
with malicious code allowing another person to log into any Unix system using that
login program. The moral of this Turing Award winning paper is no program that
was not fully written by you can never be fully trusted. Interestingly enough the form
in which the C compiler functions with the malicous code makes it a form of a self
replicating program.
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In 1986 Fred Cohen defended his PhD dissertation at the University of Southern
California entitled Computer Viruses [20]. This dissertation is considered one of the
seminal papers researching computer viruses. It was the first time the term virus was
used to represent self replicating programs. Using Turing machines, Cohen describes
a virus as being a sequence of symbols which is able, when interpreted in a suitable
environment, to modify other sequences of symbols in that environment by including
a possibly evolved copy of itself. He also provides the first formal definition of a
computer virus using Turing machines.
A virus is presented as being a viral set, where membership is acquired if and
only if a sequence of symbols on an input tape causes a Turing machine to copy a
sequence of symbols to some new location further down on the tape. This captures
the fundamental meaning of virus replication. Cohen also gives a formal definition
for viral evolution, showing that a virus can change its appearance during replication.
This was the fundamental definition for the class of polymorphic and metamorphic
viruses [44]. Many properties of viral sets are formally shown. He proved that it is
undecidable to determine if a virus is an evolved version of some other virus.
In [21], Cohen conducts various experiments running computer viruses on com-
puter systems. The results showed that systems protected by the Bell-LaPadula [13]
system were insufficient to prevent viral attack and determines integrity control [34]
to be essential to securing a system. Cohen states in [21] that absolute protection
from viruses is attainable by absolute isolation of a computer but notes that this is
impractical. He further states that to be secure from viruses a system must protect
against outgoing information flow and to be secure from information leakage a sys-
tem must protect against incoming information flow. To allow sharing there must
be information flow between computers in a system. Thus Cohen’s main conclu-
16
sion in [21] is sharing in a general purpose multilevel security system is in such direct
contrast to virus security that they are not reconcilable and coexistence is impossible.
A second seminal paper in the area of computer viruses was presented by Adleman
[36]. Adleman built from the work of Cohen’s PhD dissertation, Adleman was his
adviser at USC [14]. Adleman considered the more general class of malware instead
of focusing on viruses. He gave classifications for malware and formal definitions and
proofs based on recursive functions. He states for every program there is an infected
form of the program. A virus can be viewed as a mapping from non-infected to in-
fected programs. An infected program on every input will do one of three things:
injure by damaging the computer, infect by replicating itself into other programs or
imitate where it neither infects nor injures. Imitate is considered a special case of
injure when no files are found suitable to infect.
The two basic types of malware defined are pathogenic and contagious. Where
pathogenic will injure and not infect or imitate. Contagious will infect or imitate but
not injure. The following four basic types are defined: benignant is not pathogenic or
contagious, Trojan horse is pathogenic and is not contagious, carrier is not pathogenic
and is contagious, and virulent is pathogenic and is contagious. This classification
considers the behavior of an infected program compared to its non infected form. A
second classification is given, here only the behavior of an infected program alone
is considered. Four types are defined as follows: benign is not pathogenic and not
contagious, Epeian is pathogenic and not contagious, disseminating is not pathogenic
and is contagious, and malicious is pathogenic and contagious.
Three final observations are made with members of the second class and those of
the first class as follows: if an object is benign then it is benignant, if an object is
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Epeian then it is benignant and a Trojan horse, and finally if an object disseminating
then it is benignant and a carrier. The second classification included all current forms
of malware with Epeian includes non-replicating malware such as Trojan horses and
logic bombs [15, 44] and disseminating and malicious encapsulate replicating malware
such as viruses and worms. The classifications are built to map every classification
back to a logical connection of the three basic behaviors of an infected program: in-
jure, infect and imitate. Today classification of malware is still performed using these
same basic characteristics.
Viruses have several subcategories of which the most prevalent are email worms,
peer to peer worms, network worms and Win32 viruses [44]. Email worms attempt
to spread primarily by covertly sending out emails attaching the virus or a copy of
the virus to the email. The addresses are usually harvested from the victim computer
and the victim’s email address is used as the sender, this is done to add a layer of
legitimacy to the virus and give confidence to the recipient in opening the attachment
thus causing the virus to enter a new computer and continue on its path.
Peer to peer worms are designed to spread through networks via peer to peer file
sharing software such as Limewire, Emule, Morphius and others. Often these worms
will replicate in known shared directories of a computer by creating new copies of it-
self several times. Each new copy will have a filename reflective of a currently popular
song, video game, celebrity or movie in the hopes of enticing other users to download
and execute the file on their computer.
Network worms replicate primarily by exploiting a vulnerability in a computer
system allowing them to spread from one computer to another across several sys-
tems. Win32 viruses represent those viruses that employ the Microsoft Windows
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32bit Application Program Interface (Win32 API) of the Windows operating system
as part of their execution. Viruses using the Win32 API at some point during their
execution are the most prevalent amongst all viruses [63].
There is a wide array of methods in which a virus can infect a file. Each of these
is a specific form of either modifying an already existing file are creating a new file
which is simply a copy of the virus itself. What follows is a list of the better known
infection strategies along with a brief description of each.
• Overwriting Viruses: a primitive technique that simply overwrites existing files
with a copy of the virus. Files that fall victim to this infection cannot be
disinfected. They must be erased and restored from an existing uninfected
backup copy, an example of this virus is the Loveletter mass mailing email worm.
This virus spread across network via attachments to emails, once executed on
a computer the virus would overwrite with itself all files ending in one of a
predefined set of file extensions.
• Appending Viruses: infect existing files by inserting a copy of the virus at the
end of the file. To successfully execute, the virus will modify the header portion
of the infected file by inserting a jump command to the memory location of the
virus within the file. The result of this is the virus executing first each time
the infected file is accessed. These files can be disinfected. The Vienna virus
implements this infection technique.
• Prepending Viruses: A very successful technique, this infection works by the
virus inserting itself into the beginning of a already existing file. The result is
instant execution of the virus each time the infected file is accessed. The file
can be disinfected, a good example of this technique is the virus Polimer.512.A
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which inserts itself with a size of 512 bytes long to the beginning of executable
(.EXE) files.
• Parasitic Viruses: Similar to the prepending virus, this type of infection inserts
the virus to the beginning of an already existing file and appends the original
beginning of the file to the end of it. In some cases the entire original file will
be save as a newly created file in some other location of the computer. A file
infected in this way is difficult to disinfect, normally the correct order of the file
cannot be restored. Viruses using this technique are Virdem, Jerusalem, Qpa
and Klez.
• Cavity Viruses: This technique does not increase the size of the file it is infecting.
It works by inserting the virus into useless areas of an existing file, for example
a file may contain an area full of zero’s, the virus will target this area to insert
itself. At the beginning of the file the virus inserts a jump command to the
memory location of the beginning of the virus. At the end of the virus is
a second jump command back to the original start point of the file. Some
examples of this technique are Lehigh and W2K.Installer.
• Entry Point Obfuscation (EPO) Viruses: This infection technique inserts the
virus within some area of an already existing file. A jump command to the
virus location is not placed at the beginning of the file, instead it is placed at
some other location within the body of the file. This leads to the virus being
executed at random. It is also a form of avoiding certain detection techniques
that analyze the beginning of files for possible modifications like the insertion of
a jump command. Some viruses using this technique are Olivia and Nexiv-Der.
Among the many different classifications in which viruses can be placed, one im-
portant category is code evolution techniques. Virus evolution occurs during the
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replication process of a virus. The purpose of evolution is to avoid detection by creat-
ing new versions of the virus that appear differently is some form when compared to
the parent virus that created it. There are three basic categories of virus evolution:
Non-evolving viruses, Polymorphic viruses and Metamorphic viruses.
Non-Evolving viruses do not modify their appearance in any way when they en-
ter the replication process. Every time the virus replicates, the newly created virus
appears exactly the same as the parent virus. The impact of this is facilitation of
identifying the virus on a computer system. A signature based virus detector only
needs one signature to detect all copies of the virus in a given system.
Polymorphic viruses mutate in some form while keeping the original virus code
intact. This is usually achieved through encryption, where a virus creates an encryp-
tion shell around itself hiding the virus from detectors. Many of these viruses carry
with them a decryption engine which is usually not encrypted and can be used for
detection. More advanced viruses also encrypt the decryption engine to further avoid
detection. In every case of polymorphic viruses there is always a small portion that
is not encrypted and is the target of detection. Some known polymorphic viruses are
1260, HPS and Marburg.
Metamorphic viruses mutate their appearance by actually changing the virus code
itself. Encryption is not used to hide the virus code, instead the virus code itself is
modified to produce a different appearing virus that performs the same as the parent.
This type of virus is normally a single piece of code that carries data in the form
of variables within it. When executed the virus uses this data in a decision process
to created evolved versions that have some its code replaced or augmented with
the data. The result is the same virus in a new body. There is great difficulty in
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detecting this type of virus since with every evolution the signature used for detection
can potentially be completely replaced with new code.
2.1.3 Virus Detection
Virus detection can be defined as the ability to identify the presence of a virus in
an object [22, 44]. The single most important aspect of Cohen’s work in [22] is his
analysis of virus detection. He proves the problem of viral detection to be undecidable
via a reduction from the Halting problem [22, 21]. The implication of this result is
no viral detection algorithm is capable of detecting all known and unknown viruses.
This leads to the production of false positives which are non viral objects being iden-
tified as viral and false negatives being those viral objects not being identified as such.
Many virus detection algorithms have been presented [43], each with its advan-
tages and disadvantages. Virus detection can be classified as one of two forms: signa-
ture based and behavior based [44, 14]. Signature based detectors work by searching
through an object for a specific sequence of bytes that uniquely identify a specific
version of a virus. This form of detection is also known as string scanning, it is the
simplest form of scanning and is quite effective. This type of detection relies on a
virus signature database [15, 44].
Each time a new virus is discovered in the wild, the binary form of the virus is
analyzed by a virus researcher. One of the goals of the analysis is to find a sequence of
bytes in the binary that can be used to specifically and uniquely identify the specific
virus being analyzed. The sequence of bytes is copied from the binary and added to
the virus database. The sequence of bytes used to identify a virus is called the virus
signature. Virus detectors using these databases must be updated frequently to get
the latest database with the most recently added virus signatures. Currently signa-
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ture based virus detection is the predominant detection method used in computers
around the world.
Behavior based detectors identify an object as being viral or not by scrutinizing
the execution behavior of a program [23, 47, 44, 15]. These detectors do not use
signatures to identify a specific virus. Instead they use measures of normal or abnor-
mal behavior to detect a running processes’s behavior as viral. Abnormal behavior is
flagged as viral and is either terminated or suspended from executing further. Behav-
ior based detection is able to detect unknown viruses [1, 17, 9]. Since the behavior of a
viral process can be similar to that of benign processes, behavior based detection can
cause false positives and false negatives. The overhead of dealing with production of
false positives keeps behavior based detection currently out of wide spread computer
use [1, 17].
In [19], Ellis presented a detection method for worms in a network using behavioral
signatures. Ellis defines a behavioral signature as having aspects of any particular
worms behavior common across the manifestations of a specific worm and with nodes
that spread in temporal order. Three characteristic patterns of worm behavior in
a network were identified as: passing similar data between two machines, Identi-
fication of the tree-like structure created by the intercommunication patterns that
emerge from infected nodes and changing a server into a client. These behaviors were
developed from the definition of a worm. Ellis also introduces network application
architecture (NAA) as a method for distributing network applications. NAA impacts
the sensitivity of this behavioral approach. This is done by placing constraints on
traffic patterns, which are violated by the patterns of worm traffic. These constraint
violations are shown to be straightforward to detect. The abstract communications
network model (ACN)is a network theoretical model of computer networks and their
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data flow presented in this paper. It is a realistic network including representations
of hosts, routers, sensors, hardware, routing, data flow, spans, user workstations and
servers. The behavioral signatures, NAA’s and worm propagation are all implemented
within the ACN framework. A worm propagation model, consisting of a set of span-
ning trees that extends the ACN to include worm spread across a network is given. A
descendant relation between nodes in the spanning trees captures communication pat-
terns that appear as a result of worm spread, this gives the foundation for detection.
The paper identifies architectural designs that improve worm detection sensitivity.
The detection approach was shown capable of detecting classes of worms without a
priori knowledge of any specific worm.
Schneider presents in [23] a characterization of security policies that are enforce-
able using execution monitoring which is an implementation of behavior based virus
detection. A security policy specifies execution that is deemed undesirable. Execution
monitoring can only enforce security policies that are a safety property. A policy that
is a safety property will not allow any bad thing to happen. This means that when a
bad thing is about to happen the enforcement mechanism terminates the execution.
A security violation is to occur at the start of some execution. This approach does
not know what may happen at some future point in the execution, it only knows what
has happened. This could lead to false positive production by terminating an execu-
tion that violated a security policy and is a part of some bigger execution that does
not violate any security policy. This condition greatly limits the type of monitoring
performed. A security automata is characterized as the enforcement implementation
of execution monitoring. When an execution starts an automata is initialized incor-
porating the security policy being enforced. For every step of execution the automata
attempts a transition to an acceptable state using an input symbol coming from the
executing object. If this succeeds the execution continues one more step. This back
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and forth process continues until execution terminates or the automata enters and
unacceptable state. This indicates a security violation and the execution should be
terminated.
Bergeron presents [26] a method of detecting malicious code in commercial off the
shelf components (COTS) using binary executable static slicing and statistical anal-
ysis. Static slicing is used to extract security critical code fragments. The fragments
are then verified against behavioral specifications to statically decide if they include
malicious behavior. The approach taken consists of three main steps: first, disassem-
ble the binary code; second, create a high level abstract view of the disassembled code
and use program slicing to remove parts of the code that are security critical; third,
detect malicious behavior in the slices based on program checking. The disassembly is
performed with commercial disassemblers. High level representation is achieved using
transformations representing idioms. An idiom is defined as a sequence of instruc-
tions holding logical meaning not derivable from the individual instructions. Slicing
the high level representation of the program is meant to retain only relevant instruc-
tions, particularly API calls that influence the value of registers. This is achieved
by using a slicing criterion. The criterion specifies a node of a control flow graph
of the disassembled code and a subset of program variables. The result is a set of
instructions used in the computation of the variables subset, this is called a slice. By
examining the variables modified in a given slice, the authors assume the slice to be
malicious or not. A given example deals with a representation of passing information
of a file named “security.txt”. This leads to assumption of malicious behavior due to
transmission of security critical information.
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2.1.4 Windows API System Calls
With the release of Windows 95 by Microsoft in 1995, a new set of system calls was
introduced. This set was call the Windows 32 bit Application Program Interface
(Win32 API) [63, 44]. The set consists of 32 bit system functions usable by any
Win32 application. The purpose of the API was to provide a set of optimized system
level operations allowing applications to run faster. The set is currently supported
by all Windows platforms. All the API functions are stored in the following dynamic
link libraries: Kernel32.dll, User32.dll, Gui32.dll and Advapi.dll. When an process is
labeled a Win32 process it indicates that process uses the Win32 API. When a Win32
process is first executed it is analyzed by the operating system and the memory ad-
dress of each Win32 API system functions that it may call is exported from a DLL
and placed in an import address table (IAT). Each Win32 process has its own IAT
and when the process makes an API system call, it looks up the function’s address
in the IAT and passes to that address any necessary parameters and the function
proceeds with execution. When an system call is made it is usually from a process
running in User mode, the called function is filtered through the operating system to
its equivalent function in the Kernel of the operating system. Once in the kernel a
service is usually requested to carry out the operation and the result filters back up
the the user application that originally made the call [25].
The Windows Kernel is an area of privileged access in charge of running the ma-
jority of system services. The kernel provides a set of its own Native Kernel mode
API functions a subset of which is called Zwxx routines [41]. These routines can be
called directly by any Kernel mode process. When one of these routines is called it
is filtered to a system request to fulfill the task.
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The complete list of Kernel mode functions is stored by memory location addresses in
the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT), this table is accessed each time a Zwxx
routine is called, the parameters are then passed to the memory location and the
function continues with its execution [25, 58].
2.1.5 File System Operations
A file can be considered as an abstract data type that has attributes and operations.
The attributes of a file include: name, identifier, type, location, size, protection, and
time, date and user identification [51]. The basic operations of a file include: creating,
writing, reading, repositioning, deleting and truncating [24, 51]. A virus is defined
as a program that can infect other programs by modifying them to include possibly
evolved version of itself [22]. From the point of view of the system a virus is a file
and therefore possesses the attributes and operations of files. I can deduce that if the
virus copies itself is must therefore invoke the read and write file operations when
it is infecting other programs. Therefore the virus must have the appropriate access
privileges in order to perform the copy [35]. In my approach it does not matter if the
copy was successful or not since I am just interested in the virus making an attempt
to replicate.
In this research I use the name, identifier and location file attributes to reference
the static image of the file on a storage device. The name (identifier - a unique tag)
of a file F is represented as F.name. The location of F is usually an argument of the
write and/or read operations that are used during file replication. Writing F involves
making a system call specifying both the name of F and the location where F will
be written. To read F a system call is invoked that states the name of F and where
in memory F or a part of F will be placed. In the event that F cannot be written or
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read in one execution of the operation then a pointer keeps track of the next block
to be written or read.
2.2 Related Work
Skormin et al. present an approach to detect replication in self contained propagating
malware [52]. Their detection is done by monitoring at run-time the execution of nor-
mal code under regular conditions. They monitor the behavior of each process and
analyze the system calls, input and output arguments and the execution results. The
Gene of Self Replication models the replication of a process using building blocks.
Each block is a portion of the self replication process including opening, closing,
reading, writing and searching for files and directories. The approach detected sev-
eral viruses across many classes with little or no false positives. My detection method
focuses only on read and write operations that have SR. This is a simplification of
the Skormin et. al. approach which consider additional operations such as search,
open, create as essential parts of a replication process. My simplified approach re-
duces the overhead time and analysis needed to detect virus replication resulting in
faster detection.
Analysis of system call arguments to detect malicious attacks is found in [12].
Several models are presented to characterize system call arguments. These character-
izations are used to detect anomalous behavior. The research states two assumptions:
(1) malicious attacks appear in system call arguments. (2) system call arguments used
in malicious attacks substantially differ from arguments used during normal applica-
tion execution. The models detect anomalies in the arguments such as unreasonably
long string length, unusual characters and illegitimate values. The analysis of the
arguments are used to create a score that determines if the system call is part of an
attack. The models were trained with sequences of system calls giving no regard to
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the sequence but focusing only on the arguments. The testing results showed the
models to be effective in detecting malicious attacks with low false positives. My re-
search also analyzes system call arguments without considering the sequence in which
the system calls are made. The difference in my approach is I only consider read and
write system calls used during replication of a virus. My analysis of system calls
is much faster since it only involves a simple check for SR-replication. This faster
approach results in less overhead quicker detection than what Mutz et al. propose.
A rule based approach for analyzing system call arguments and their invoking
process appear in [37]. The research proposes a threat level classification of system
calls based on their ability to penetrate a system with full system control and denial
of service attacks. This classification is used to grant invocation of security critical
system calls. The system call is invoked only if the process invoking the call and the
arguments comply with an access control database. The system call arguments are
analyzed to detect malicious intent such as rewriting a critical directory or process.
This work takes file system calls into special consideration as they can lead to pen-
etration of privileged areas of a system. My work also considers file system calls as
they are primarily used in the replication process of a virus. My approach differs in
which system call arguments are analyze. I only analyze arguments of read and write
system calls leading to less analysis and faster detection.
The host-based intrusion detection system BlueBox [53] defines system call in-
trospection. The introspection consists of rules used to analyze system calls when
they are invoked to conclude if they can be part of an intrusion or not. System call
arguments are scrutinized to prevent time-of-check-to-time-of-use attacks and proves
effective. The arguments are recorded by BlueBox for a system call at time of check.
At the time of use the arguments present in the system call are compared to the
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recorded arguments. Any difference in the arguments concludes the system call to
be a possible attack. My approach also analyzes system call arguments, but at the
point of execution. I inspect the arguments of system calls that are a read or write
system call. My approach has the advantage of analyzing the arguments of a smaller
number of system calls leading to faster analysis and detection.
In [47], anomalous intrusion detection was performed via system call monitoring.
A database was trained to recognize the normal behavior of benign processes in a
system. The benign processes were executed multiple times and their sequence of
system calls was recorded in the database. Anomaly detection occurred by monitor-
ing process executions. The system calls made by the process were compared to the
database, if the process made system calls not matching the database, the process
was marked as anomalous. An assumption was made stating anomalous behavior
is assumed as an intrusion. Their are some key drawbacks to this approach. First,
determining exhaustive training of the database for a benign process. It is the de-
cision of a human to state when a benign program has been executed enough times
to capture all possible sequences of system calls even with short sequences. What
guarantee can be given toward a short sequence of system calls not being left out? If
this occurs the detector can create a false positive by identifying normal behavior as
anomalous. Second, frequent retraining is needed each time a new program is added
to the system. Each time a new program is installed on the system the database must
be trained to recognize its normal behavior. This adds overhead to the maintenance
of the system, if one program is left out of training the protection of the system is at
risk. Third, the paper does not address training a database for normal behavior of a
program that has an intrusion built into it. In this case the intrusion will be recog-
nized as normal behavior and a false negative will be produced. My research takes
the same approach of monitoring system calls to detect intrusions. The difference of
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my approach is the analysis is done on sequence of system calls done by viruses. More
specifically, the subset representing the replication of the virus. The analysis is done
without a priori knowledge resulting in no need for a detection database. This is an
improvement on the approach in [47] where training must be done and a database
updated for each new program.
In [45], finite state automata (FSA) is used to train normal behavior of programs
in a system. The training results is stored in a database later used for detection of
intrusions seen as anomalous behavior. The training works by recording the sequence
of system calls of a benign process after multiple executions. During monitoring the
FSA attempts to transition from one state to the next based on the system calls made
by the executing process. If the FSA cannot perform a transition or encounters an
unknown location of a system call the process is marked as anomalous. If a transition
occurs but enters a state not in the automaton the FSA enters a sink state. This is
a temporary state that allows execution of new code. The FSA will transition out of
the sink state when able to enter a new state found in the automaton. A leaky bucket
algorithm is used to aggregate anomalies over time. Weights are given to anomalies
based on the seriousness of the specific anomaly. The weights are designed to flag
a process as an intrusion when anomalies have occurred a certain amount of times.
The more serious anomalies weights cause in intrusion detection in as little as one
occurrence. There is one critical drawback to this approach. Allowing new code to
execute while the FSA is in a sink state can allow for an intrusion to occur and not be
flagged as anomalous. The intrusion can be dynamically injected into the process at
runtime and execute freely, thus creating a false negative. Also an encrypted intru-
sion such as a polymorphic virus can bypass detection. The sink state will allow viral
code that is unencrypted at runtime to execute. Upon completing execution the viral
code returns control to the host at which point the FSA would exit the sink state
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without detecting anything as anomalous. The research I am conducting follows the
idea of weights for detecting viruses. I similarly use metrics when analyzing system
calls of an executing process to detect viral behavior. Since I detect viral behavior
based on replication, a virus that is unencrypted or dynamically injected and exe-
cuted during runtime should be detected by my implementation. This is true since
being classified as a virus implies replication will occur at some point in the execution.
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CHAPTER 3
SELF-REFERENCE VIRUS REPLICATION
Replication is the fundamental qualifying characteristic of all viruses [22, 14, 44].
For a specific malware to be classified as a virus it must have the ability to replicate.
This guarantees the replication characteristic is consistently present in all viruses.
Replication is therefore an excellent basis for detection algorithms to successfully de-
tect viruses under several conditions and that belong to many different classes [30].
When a virus replicates, it will execute a series of operations that will cause the virus
to be written to some other area of the target system. The virus can infect one or
more currently existing files and infect the system by copying itself to newly created
target files. Both of these infection types require a series of read and write operations
to succeed.
Self-reference is an essential property of the read and write operations executed
by a virus during replication. A virus must refer to itself in order to replicate itself
to some other area of the target system. The term “itself” refers to the static im-
age of the virus file saved on a storage device such as a hard drive. The name of
the virus file is the same as the name of the executing virus process. This name is
passed between read and write operations as the source or ”from” argument of the
replication. I named this property the self-reference property (SR) and replication
that occurs using SR I identify as SR-replication. SR is the focus of this research
and SR-replication is the centerpiece of my behavior based virus detection approach.
The basic definition of SR-replication is a running process transferring and storing
data, belonging to its source object, from one object to another object where the first
transfer is always from the source object. The object is any temporary or permanent
storage available in a computer and accessible by a running process. This includes
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both file and memory storage. The source object is from where the process was cre-
ated. For examples a running process’s source object may be the static image file
that is executed to create the process. The process can transfer data from any object
including its source object to any other object as long as the data being transferred
belongs to the source object of the process performing the transfer. I present a detec-
tion approach for SR-replication that is based on SR which focuses on the transitive
relation between a running virus’s static image file and a target file. The transitive
relation is based on the transfer of data from the virus’s static image file to the target
file. By detecting SR-replication I may be able to detect both known and unknown
viruses belonging to different virus classes and that execute under several conditions.
I further assume SR-replication to be unique to viruses and that it is unlikely for
SR-replication to occur in benign processes. I do recognize that not all viruses will
replicate using SR-replication and these viruses may not be detected by my approach.
Static analysis of viruses and benign processes was conducted to establish pre-
liminary support on my assumptions of SR-replication. A test set of 56 viruses was
built by downloading live samples from various Internet malware repositories [60, 42].
A second test set of benign processes was built using 56 executable processes from
the Microsoft Windows System32 folder. All the viruses were randomly chosen and
belong to the classes of Win32 viruses, network worms, email worms and peer-to-peer
worms. The virtual machine software VMware Workstation with Windows XP SP2
was used to execute the the test sets. The programs Api Spy 32 and Process Monitor
[7, 55] were used to create log files documenting the system calls made by each pro-
cess in one complete execution. Each log file was examined for SR-replication. This
was determined through identification of SR by examining the arguments of read
and write system calls for a reference in the “from” argument that was the name of
the currently executing process or a temporary memory location where the currently
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Email Replication Peer to Peer Replication
Worms Attempts Worms Attempts
Baconex 1 Agobot.a 1
Bagle.a 1 Banuris.b 217
Bagle.j 1 Bereb.a 474
Bagle.k 1 Bereb.b 481
Bagle.m 1 Blaxe 6
Bagle.n 1 Cassidy 19
Bagle.o 1 Cocker 61
Dumaru.r 3 Compux.a 36
Eyeveg.m 1 Delf.a 1
Klez.a 3 Gagse 257
Klez.e 1 Irkaz 2
Klez.i 1 Kanyak.a 1
klez.j 2 Kifie.c 2
Mimail.j 1 Mantas 233
Network Replication Win32 Replication
Worms Attempts Viruses Attempts
Afire.b 3 Apathy.5378 1
Afire.d 1 Arch.a 1
Bobic.k 1 Barcos.a 4
Bozori.b 1 BCB.a 60
Bozori.e 1 Bee 2
Bozori.j 1 Canbis.a 14
Cycle.a 1 Civut.a 1
Dabber.c 1 Cornad 1
Domwoot 1 Jlok 2
Doomjuice.b 1 Parite.a 1
Doomran 1 Parite.b 1
Incef.b 27 Tenga.a 1
Kidala.a 1 Watcher.a 1
Lebreat.a 1 Zori.a 1
Figure 3.1: 56 Viruses with Replication Attempts
executing process had copied itself earlier in the execution. The results of the testing
are in Figures 3 and 3.2.
The total number of SR-replication for each process listed in Figures 3 and 3.2 is
the count of distinct filenames that each process attempted to infect in one execution.
I did not verify if each attempt was a success or a failure. The attempt to perform
SR-replication is enough for me to label the process as a possible virus regardless if
it is successful or not. The test results all 56 viruses attempted SR-replication at
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Benign Replication Benign Replication
Processes Attempts Processes Attempts
accevt 0 ckcnv 0
accwiz 0 cleanmgr 0
actmovie 0 clipbrd 0
ahui 0 cmd 0
append 0 cmdl32 0
blastcln 0 common32 0
bootcfg 0 control 0
bootok 0 convert 0
cacls 0 cscript 0
charmap 0 csrss 0
chkdsk 0 ctfmon 0
chkntfs 0 debug 0
cipher 0 defrag 0
cisvc 0 diskpart 0
Benign Replication Benign Replication
Processes Attempts Processes Attempts
diskperf 0 ipconfig 0
dllhost 0 ipv6 0
dmremote 0 lodctr 0
doskey 0 lpq 0
eventcreate 0 lsass 0
exe2bin 0 makecab 0
extrac32 0 mem 0
fastopen 0 netsetup 0
finger 0 notepad 0
fsutil 0 ntbackup 0
getmac 0 openfiles 0
help 0 ping 0
hostname 0 qprocess 0
iexpress 0 setup 0
Figure 3.2: 56 Benign processes with Replication attempts
least one time to as many as over 400 times in a single complete execution. None
of the benign processes attempted SR-replication. These results provided support of
my assumptions and lead me to create a formal model for SR-replication.
3.1 Formal Model
An operation o is invoked with arguments (a1 . . . an) by a currently executing pro-
cess P where P.name is the name of P . The static file image F saved on a stor-
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age device is from where P was created. The name and path of F is held in
F.name and P.name 7→ F.name, thus P.name refers both to P and F . The la-
bel T is a temporary memory location containing a copy of F . When an oper-
ation o ∈ O = {read(s, d), write(s, d)} where the source argument s = ai and
destination argument d = aj with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and i 6= j is invoked by P where
s ∈ S = {P.name, T} then o is said to have the self-reference property (SR). The ar-
gument d ∈ D = {M, I.name} where M is temporary memory location and I.name
is the name of the destination static image file I saved on a storage device with
I.name 6= P.name. The formal definition for SR is given in Figure 3.3.
SR(o) = true iff o ∈ O and o.s ∈ S with
• O = {read(s, d), write(s, d)}
• s ∈ S = {P.name, T}
• d ∈ D = {M, I.name}
• P.name = name of currently executing process that is invoking o
• T = temporary memory location containing a copy of the static file image F
• M = temporary memory location
• I.name = name of the destination file
• o.s = the s argument of o
• o.d = the d argument of o
Figure 3.3: Formal definition of SR property
I restrict the set O to only read and write operations. I assume a process only
needs to execute a sequence of these two operations to attempt replication. The sets
S and D are restricted to static file images and temporary memory locations because
I am only detecting replication of one file to one or more files where one or more
temporary memory locations are used to complete the process. The basis case for
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SR(o) = true is with o.s = P.name. In this case P refers to F in an attempt to
read or write itself to o.d. In the case where o.s = T , SR(o) = true when o(T, d) was
invoked by P at time t, o(s,M) was invoked by P at time t′, t′ < t and T =M = F .
In this case P must have previously invoked at least one o with o.d = M , placing F
into M which results in M converting to T . By uniquely enumerating all o executed
by P with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, I can define SR(om) in terms of FRom.s as shown in Figure
3.4. Testing for SR(om) is equivalent to establishing a transitive relation R between
F and om.s. When FRom.s = true→ F = om.s through invocation of o1 . . . om by P .
∀om(s, d) executed by P with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, SR(om(s, d)) = true iff FRom.s = true
Figure 3.4: Transitive relation of SR
P invokes a sequence of om operations with 1 ≤ m ≤ n. If o1.s ∈ S, om.d =
I.name, o = write(s, d), I.name 6= P.name and SR(F, I) = true then P is said to
have performed self-reference replication (SR-replication). The formal definition of
SR-replication in Figure 3.5 focuses on detecting processes that read and write their
static file image to other newly created or already existing static file images. This
can be accomplished in one write operation or in several read and write operations,
also many memory locations can be used intermediately from F to I. SR(F, I) is
established by testing for SR on every o that leads from P.name to I.name, thus
SR− replication(P ) = true iff a transitive relation FRI = true. I assume that static
file images can only be read from and written to. The definition does not detect a
process that overwrites or modifies its own static file image.
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SR− replication(P ) = true iff
• ∃o1 . . . om with 1 ≤ m ≤ n, where
– o = write(s, d) and
– om.s ∈ S
– om.d = I.name
– I.name 6= P.name
– SR(F, I) = true
Figure 3.5: Formal definition of SR− replication
3.2 Detection Algorithms
When P starts execution, the operations o can be traced using a directed graph G
consisting of edge = om and node = {P.name, T,M, I.name}. A graph is created
for each P in a system and is linked to a specific P by the value of the first node
of G which must always be P.name. Upon P invoking its first operation o where
om.s = P.name a new G is created and its root node = P.name. When a new edge is
added it must be of the form om.s→ om.d with s ∈ S and d ∈ D and the value om.s
must already be present as a previous om.d node in G with exception of cases where
om.s = P.name which is the root node of G. A sample graph is given in Figure 3.6
for a process named vx1.
In Figure 3.6 each o is enumerated in order of execution by P . The first two oper-
ations read(M1,M3), write(M3, sys.bat) are not included in the G since neither has
om.s = P.name which is vx1. The root node of the G must always be the first o of P
where o.s = P.name. I see this in read1 where read1.s = vx1. Notice the operation
read1,6, the notation shows the operation with the same arguments occurred twice,
at the first and sixth invocation. Every operation in G is true for SR and correctly
placed in the form om.s → omd. A test for SR − replication(vx1) was done when
the operation write5(M2, services.exe) was added to G. The path vx1 rightarrow
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• P.name = vx1
• operations =
read(M1,M3), write(M3, sys.bat), read1(vx1,M2),
read2(vx1,M4), read3(M2,M5), read4(M5,M6),
write5(M2, services.exe), read6(vx1,M2)
2
4 5 6
1,6
2
3
4
5
G
Figure 3.6: Sample Abstract Graph for vx1
services.exe shows the transitive relation FRI. This path also satisfies my definition
of SR− replication in Figure 3.5 and therefore SR− replication(vx1) = true. When
a graph G of a process P contains a path from P.name→ I.name then FRI = true
which results in SR− replication(P ) = true. Construction of G only continues until
SR− replication(P ) = true then P can be flagged as exhibiting virus replication. If
P finish execution and SR− replication(P ) = false then P is assumed benign.
If P invokes an operation om(s, d) where SR(O) = false and om.d is already a
node of G, then om.d must be removed in one of two ways: If om.d is a leaf node, it
is simply removed and G remains the same. If om.d is an internal node in G then
om.d is removed and G is reorganized by eliminating all incoming edges to om.d and
repositioning all outgoing edges from om.d to each child node to come from each
parent node of om.d to the child node. Figure 3.7 shows graph G from Figure 3.6
after removal of node M2. The incoming edge Read1,6 from the parent node vx1 was
eliminated and the outgoing edges Read4 and Write5 were each reposition to come
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4 5 6
2
3
4
5
G
Figure 3.7: Reorganized abstract graph for vx1 after removal of node M 2
from the parent node vx1 to the child nodes M6 and services.exe.
3.3 Example
In this section I will use portions of the log file of a virus used in the static analysis
to give an example of SR and SR − replication using a graph for testing. The log
file was created using API SPY 32 [7] which logs all the Win32 API calls invoked
by a process [41, 63]. The example in Figure 3.8 is of the Cassidy worm, a packed
Peer-to-Peer worm [54, 44] that from the static analysis testing results in Table 3
attempted replication 19 times. In the partial log file, the Cassidy worm attempted
to copy itself six times using the API call CopyFileA which is the same as the API
call CopyFile but is used when dealing with the ANSI character set [63]. From Table
3.9, CopyFileA is mapped to write(lpExistingFileName,lpNewFileName). As an
example, the fourth CopyFileA operation is mapped to:
write(“C:\DOCUME 1\JAM-VX 1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE”,
“C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\kazaa hack.exe”).
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All the other operations are mapped in similar fashion. In the graph:
rootnode = CASSIDY.EXE and SR(om) = true for each om in the graph.
Consider
write4(C:\DOCUME 1\JAM-VX 1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE,
C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\kazaa hack.exe).
We can see:
P =CASSIDY.EXE,
P.name = write4.s = C:\DOCUME 1\JAM-VX 1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE and
I.name = write4.d = C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\kazaa hack.exe.
Applying these values to the definition of SR in Figure 3.3, results in SR(write4) =
true and this result holds for all the other writem operations as well. When oper-
ation write1 was invoked, the graph was updated and a test for SR − replication
was conducted since a write operation occurred with write.d = I.name = diablo
2 pindlebot.exe. It is clear to see that SR − replication(CASSIDY.EXE) = true
according to the definition in Figure 3.5,. Had this been a real time detection, the
process would have been flagged as exhibiting virus replication behavior. To allow
readability, only the filenames were placed in the graph of Figure 3.8 when it should
be the complete path and filename.
3.4 Limitations
My approach is based on general read and write operations. I assume any specific
operation that performs a read, write or copy by specifying in the arguments the
source and destination can be equivalently written using the general read and write
operations used in this research. Figure 3.9 shows some Win32 API calls [63] and
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Partial Log File for Cassidy Worm
00402D6E:CopyFileA(LPSTR:00BA0330:"C:\DOCUME~1\JAM-VX~1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE",
                   LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\diablo 2 pindlebot.exe", 
                   BOOL:00000000)
00402D28:GetWindowsDirectoryA(LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\diablo 2 pindlebot.exe", 
                              DWORD:00000104)
00402D6E:CopyFileA(LPSTR:00BA0330:"C:\DOCUME~1\JAM-VX~1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE",
                   LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\diablo 2 maphack.exe",
                   BOOL:00000000)
00402D28:GetWindowsDirectoryA(LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\diablo 2 maphack.exe", 
                              DWORD:00000104)
00402D6E:CopyFileA(LPSTR:00BA0330:"C:\DOCUME~1\JAM-VX~1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE",
                   LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\playstation2 emulator.exe",
                   BOOL:00000000)
00402D28:GetWindowsDirectoryA(LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\playstation2 emulator.exe", 
                              DWORD:00000104)
00402D6E:CopyFileA(LPSTR:00BA0330:"C:\DOCUME~1\JAM-VX~1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE", 
                   LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\kazaa hack.exe",
                   BOOL:00000000)
00402D28:GetWindowsDirectoryA(LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\kazaa hack.exe", 
                              DWORD:00000104)
00402D6E:CopyFileA(LPSTR:00BA0330:"C:\DOCUME~1\JAM-VX~1\Desktop\CASSIDY.EXE", 
                   LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\cable modem utility.exe",
                   BOOL:00000000)
00402D28:GetWindowsDirectoryA(LPSTR:00BA0200:"C:\WINDOWS\Shared Folder\cable modem utility.exe", 
                              DWORD:00000104)
playstation2 
emulator.exe
1
2
3 4
5
6
Figure 3.8: SR− replication of Cassidy Peer-to-Peer Worm
their conversion to an equivalent general read or write operation. Note that I am
only interested in the source and destination arguments of the operation.
My approach focuses on detecting SR−replication on a local machine, it currently
does not detect SR−replication from one local machine to another across a network.
I am aware of the ability of some viruses to replicate without using SR− replication.
This can be accomplished either by replicating from a source that is not P or invok-
ing commands in some other process that results in replicating P . These types of
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Win32 API Read/Write operation
BOOL WINAPI CopyFile(
in LPCTSTR lpExistingFileName,
in LPCTSTR lpNewFileName,
in BOOL bFailIfExists); write(lpExistingFileName,
lpNewFileName)
BOOL WINAPI ReadFile(
in HANDLE hFile,
out LPVOID lpBuffer,
in DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead,
out LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesRead,
in LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped); read(hFile, lpBuffer)
BOOL WINAPI WriteFileEx(
in HANDLE hFile,
in LPCVOID lpBuffer,
in DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite,
in LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped,
in LPOVERLAPPED COMPLETION
ROUTINE lpCompletionRoutine); write(lpBuffer, hFile)
Figure 3.9: Win32 API calls with equivalent read/write operation
replication I refer to as indirect self-reference replication, (ISR− replication), and is
currently not detectable by my current approach.
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CHAPTER 4
SELF-REFERENCE DETECTION PROTOTYPE
To test my SR-replication theory, a runtime monitor implementation prototype
named SRRAT (SR-Replication Analysis Tool) was created in two versions. One
version runs in user mode and the other in Kernel mode, both prototypes were built
to run on the Windows XP platform. The user mode version tracks API function calls
and the Kernel version tracks system services used by all currently running processes
using a technique known as hooking [25, 58]. Each prototype followed the design
architecture in Figure 4.1. The architecture consists of two main components: API
Call Processor and the SR-Replication Detector. The API call processor is composed
of: HookAPI, MapAPI-RW and an API Repository. The SR-Replication Detector
consists of: SR test, SR-Replication test, Update-Graph and a graph storage.
The overall idea of the prototype is to follow the execution of processes on a sys-
tem. As the process executes it will inevitably interact with the operating system
and this interaction is recorded and analyzed by SRRAT. The method of interaction
between all processes including viruses and the operating system is through the in-
vocation of API function calls and Kernel system services [25, 58, 63, 41]. SRRAT
tracks only a subset, principally those that implement file system operations: open,
close, read, write, copy and and a few other operations. When one of these is invoked
by a process, SRRAT hooks it and analyzes its parameters to determine the presence
of SR and if SR-replication has occurred. A hook is a method by which a user can
redefine a standard API call and have the operating system redirect invocations of
the standard API call to the user defined API call.
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API Call Processor
SR-Replication Detector
Figure 4.1: SRRAT Architecture
It is very powerful in the sense that a user can modify the execution behavior of
processes without having direct access to the source code of that process. The fol-
lowing is a description of the purpose and responsibility of each component of SRRAT.
The API Call Processor’s (ACP) main purpose is to detect the invocation of an
monitored API call and pass its parameters to the SR-replication detector. The ACP
is in idle mode waiting for the operating system to send a notification that a moni-
tored API has been invoked by some process. At this point the APC takes control
of the invocation and checks to see if the API is a read or write operation according
to a predefined mapping. If the API is a read or write operation the APC passes it
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along with its parameters to the SR-replication detector for further processing. Dur-
ing this time the process that originally invoked the API is in a wait state pending
the completion of the API. This serves to stall the execution of possible viruses while
they are being analyzed for SR-replication. The APC consists of two subcomponents
called HookAPI and MapAPI-RW plus an API repository which are explained next.
The HookAPI subcomponent of the ACP is responsible for the actual interception
of the API calls being monitored by SRRAT. The interception is done using an API
hooking mechanism that notifies the ACP of the invocation of a specific API call
which HookAPI has hooked. Once the process calls an API that has been hooked,
the operating system redirects the call from the standard API to the user defined
API where the redirection is part of HookAPI. When HookAPI completes its job the
standard API call and its parameters have been redirected to the user defined API
call and thus commences the second component of ACP which is MapAPI-RW.
The second subcomponent of the ACP is called MapAPI-RW and it serves the
singular purpose of deciding if the API call that has been passed to it is a general
read or write operation. If the API is determined to be a read or write operation
then the API is labeled as such and it is passed along with the source and destination
parameters to the SR-replication detector, which is the second component of SR-
RAT. The determination of an API being a read or write operation is accomplished
by searching for the API name in the API repository and checking if its mapping is
to a read or write operation. If it is matched to a read or write operation, the API
parameters specified in the repository as the source and destination parameters are
parsed from the API call’s parameter structure and passed along with the API and
its read/write label to the SR-replication detector.
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The ACP has an API repository which is a list of all the hooked API functions.
The list has the API function name and the parameter names of the source and des-
tination parameter according the the specific API function’s documentation [63, 41]
along with its mapping as a read or write operation. The API repository does not
have the name of API functions that are not read or write operations even though
they may be hooked by SRRAT for various implementation reasons. Only those API
functions that represent a read or write operation require a mapping to a general read
or write operation with the appropriate parameters and therefore are the only ones
that need to be stored in the repository.
The second main component of SRRAT is the SR-replication detector (SRD).
This component will execute as a result of the ACP passing along to SRD an API
function that has been determined to be a read or write operation. The API function
is received with the function name, a read or write label and the source and destina-
tion parameters. SRD has several responsibilities, the first one is to check for SR, if
SR has occurred then a graph has to be created for the process that invoked this API
function. If a graph already exists it is updated. The second responsibility is to check
for SR-replication, this is done when a graph is updated with a write operation where
the destination is the name of a file. The third responsibility is to return a detection
confirmed message back to SRRAT so the process can be terminated and flagged as
exhibiting possible virus behavior. The read and write operations of a process are
stored in a graph using nodes and edges. SR-replication is determined by traversing
the graph to establish transitivity between the process name at the root node and a
file name located in some leaf node. SRD is composed of three subsections: SR-test,
SR-replication test and update graph plus a graph storage which are explained below.
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The SR-test subcomponent of the SRD is responsible for testing if a process has
attempted to reference itself in the source parameter of an API function that it has
invoked. I am most interested in this case when it occurs in read or write operations.
The test is performed by comparing the process name with the source parameter of
the API function. If the process name is a substring of the source parameter then
the process has tested positive for SR. The other form of testing for SR is to search
the existing graph of the process for a node that matches the source parameter of the
API function. If a match is made on the graph then process has tested positive for
SR. When SR occurs the API function with all its parameter information is passed
along to update graph for insertion in an existing graph or creation of a new graph.
The second subcomponent of the SRD is called SR-replication test (SRT) and its
principle responsibility is to check if SR-replication has been attempted by a spe-
cific process. This test occurs every time a process’s graph has been updated with
a write operation where the destination is a file. The graph is traversed backwards
from the just inserted node, which contains the destination parameter of the API
function which is a file name and path, back to the root node of the graph. If a path
exists between these two points then the transitivity property holds true between the
process and another file and therefore SR-replication has been attempted and SRT
returns true to SRRAT.
The third subcomponent of SRD is Update-Graph which is in charge of adding
new nodes to the graph as they are passed in from the SR-test. When an API func-
tion with its source and destination parameter are passed in, one of several actions
can be taken. If there is no existing graph for the process that invoked this API
function and the source parameter is the file name and path of the process, then a
new graph is created with the source parameter as the root. If a graph already exists
49
for the process, the graph is traversed to find a node that matches the API functions
source parameter. When a match is made if the node has no outgoing edges or none
of its outgoing edges point to a node that matches the destination parameter then
a new edge is created from the existing node to a new node with the file name and
path stored in the destination parameter. If an edge already exists with the same
source and destination parameters but a different API function name on the edge, the
new edge is created. If an edge already exists with the same source and destination
parameters and the same API function name on the edge then only its enumeration
is modified to show the order of execution for multiple attempts of the same API
function by the same process with the same source and destination parameters. Once
the update to the graph is done, a notification is sent to SRT if and only if the
just inserted edge contains an API function that is a write operation. The last opera-
tion done by this subcomponent before exiting is to save the graph in the Graph Store.
The SRD has a Graph Store which is a temporary memory storage of all the
graphs currently being used by SRRAT to track processes. Each graph is accessed by
the root node which holds the name of the process currently running on the system.
When a process with a graph in the store finishes execution or is terminated by
SRRAT, its graph is destroyed to release memory and reduce resource usage on the
system.
4.1 User Mode Prototype
The first version of SRRAT was implemented as a user mode process running in Win-
dows XP. In this version, SRRAT traced the Win32 API function calls invoked by
all currently running user mode processes. The prototype was a terminate and stay
resident runtime monitor, meaning it would be quietly running in the background
monitoring the execution behavior of all user mode processes currently running on
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Win32 API Read operation
void CopyMemory(
PVOID Destination,
const VOID* Source,
SIZE T Length); read(Source, Destination)
BOOL WINAPI ReadFile(
HANDLE hFile,
LPVOID lpBuffer,
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead,
LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesRead,
LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped); read(hFile, lpBuffer)
BOOL WINAPI ReadFileEx(
HANDLE hFile,
LPVOID lpBuffer,
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead,
LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped,
LPOVERLAPPED COMPLETION ROUTINE
lpCompletionRoutine); read(hFile, lpBuffer)
Figure 4.2: Mapping of Read Win32 API calls in user version SRRAT
the system while conveniently placed as an icon in the windows task bar for simple
start and stop functionality. The API functions that were traced for read and write
operations are listed in Figures 4.2 and tableofmappedwriteapis along with their read-
/write mapping and the source and destination parameters. All the API functions
that were monitored by SRRAT are located in the kernel32.dll dynamic link library.
SRRAT implemented API hooking on the functions that were being monitored. To
successfully perform hooking SRRAT was implemented as a dynamic link library.
Aside from the API functions monitored in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for their read and
write operations necessary to establish SR and SR-replication, there were other API
functions, listed in Figure 4.4 that had to be hooked and monitored to correctly im-
plement this version of SRRAT. The following is a description of the implementation
of the components of SRRAT in user mode.
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Win32 API Write operation
BOOL WINAPI CopyFile(
LPCTSTR lpExistingFileName,
LPCTSTR lpNewFileName,
BOOL bFailIfExists); write(lpExistingFileName,
lpNewFileName)
BOOL WINAPI CopyFileA(
LPCTSTR lpExistingFileName,
LPCTSTR lpNewFileName,
BOOL bFailIfExists); map(lpExistingFileName,
lpNewFileName)
static BOOL WINAPI CopyFileW(
LPCWSTR lpExistingFileName,
LPCWSTR lpNewFileName,
BOOL bFailIfExists); map(lpExistingFileName,
lpNewFileName)
BOOL WINAPI ReplaceFile(
LPCTSTR lpReplacedFileName,
LPCTSTR lpReplacementFileName,
LPCTSTR lpBackupFileName,
DWORD dwReplaceFlags,
LPVOID lpExclude,
LPVOID lpReserved); write(lpReplacementFileName,
lpReplacedFileName)
BOOL WINAPI WriteFile(
HANDLE hFile,
LPCVOID lpBuffer,
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite,
LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesWritten,
LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped); write(lpBuffer, hFile)
BOOL WINAPI WriteFileEx(
HANDLE hFile,
LPCVOID lpBuffer,
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToWrite,
LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped,
LPOVERLAPPED COMPLETION
lpCompletionRoutine); write(lpBuffer, hFile)
Figure 4.3: Mapping of Write Win32 API calls used in user version SRRAT
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Win32 API Read/Write operation
void CreateFileW(
LPCWSTR lpFileName); update list with new file/handle:
lpFileName and HANDLE
HANDLE WINAPI CreateFileA(
LPCSTR lpFileName); update list with new file/handle:
lpFileName and HANDLE
HFILE WINAPI OpenFile(
LPCSTR lpFileName); update list with new file/handle:
lpFileName and HFILE
BOOL WINAPI CloseHandle(
HANDLE hObject); read(hFile, lpBuffer)
BOOL WINAPI DeleteFile(
LPCTSTR lpFileName); remove from list existing file/handle:
lpFileName
Figure 4.4: List of Win32 API calls needed to implement user version of SRRAT
4.1.1 Implementation
The HookAPI was implemented using hooking techniques for Win32 user mode API
function calls. This is accomplished with the invocation by HookAPI of an API func-
tion called SetWindowsHookEX [63, 41]. Invoking this function allowed SRRAT to
hook API functions by rewriting the IAT of all currently running processes. SRRAT
reads from the API repository all the API function names that needed to be moni-
tored which are listed in Figures 4.2 and 4.4. These names are loaded into memory
and HookAPI invokes SetWindowsHookEX. For each API functions that needs to be
hooked, SRRAT has a new version of the API which implemented my SR-replication
detection code. Each running process has in its IAT table the memory address of all
the Win32 API functions that it may invoke during its execution. When the hooks
are placed for SRRAT, Windows overwrites these memory locations with memory
locations of my redefined API functions. This change of memory addresses allowed
Windows to redirect invocations of the monitored API functions from the standard
API function to my version of the function. Hooking the API functions in HookAPI
was the critical step needed for SRRAT to function.
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The MapAPI-RW subcomponent was automated as a result of API hooking tech-
niques. My redefined API functions are executed only when the API is invoked by
some process. As a result when the body of my API function executed I already pre-
determined the function to be a read or write. In the body of the function I inserted
code to read the correct parameters that represented the source and destination and
continued to the SRD component of SRRAT.
One key piece of information needed for the SRD to work was acquiring the name
of the process invoking the API function currently being processed through SRRAT.
In Windows, process names are represented in two forms, the first is as a string
containing the full process name and path, the second is with a process id (PID).
When a process starts execution, Windows assigns it an integer value which is the
process’s PID, this value is used for various tasks throughout the life cycle of the
process, especially when it interacts with the Windows operating system. When a
process invokes a hooked API, Windows provided SRRAT a field of the hooked API
structure containing the full process name and path as a string. This was used to
implement the SRD.
A second key piece of information used by SRD is names of files that are read or
written by a process. in similar fashion to processes, files in Windows are represented
in two forms, the first is a string with the file name and path, the second is with a file
handle. The file handle is an integer value assigned to a file when it is first opened by
a process and destroyed when the file is closed. Some API functions such as ReadFile
and WriteFile, use handles to represent the file that is being accessed but other API
functions such as OpenFile use a string to represent the filename. Thus one file can
have two ways of representation and this required the SRD to keep a list of file names
and their associated handle. Each time the API functions OpenFile and CreateFile
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was invoked, SRD would make a new entry in the list of the newly opened or created
file and the associated file handle. This entry would later be removed from the list
when CloseFile was invoked. Each time ReadFile, WriteFile functions were in-
voked SRD would look up the file handle and return the associated file name and path.
Once all the needed information became accessible to the SRD, performing SR
tests was straightforward, every time a read operation occurred the filename and
path in the source parameter would be compared to the process name. If the process
name was a substring of the source parameter then SR was indeed present. Each
time SR was found the graph for the process would be updated in Update-Graph.
The graph store was a set of graphs each one with a different process name as the
root node which identified the graph uniquely. A test for SR-replication occurred
each time the WriteFile or CopyFile API function was hooked. The graph for the
process was retrieved from the storage and traversed backwards from the newly added
destination node from the WriteFile or CopyFile API to the root node checking for
transitivity. When SR-replication was established for a specific process, that process
was terminated by SRD using the TerminateProcess API function [63, 41].
4.1.2 Limitations
Several viruses do not interact with the operating system at the user mode level.
Instead, they deal directly with the kernel and its function calls thus completely
avoiding SRRAT. These viruses cannot be detected by the user mode version of
SRRAT. Also this version ran in user mode and can be infected by the very same
virus it is trying to detect if the virus injured before infecting, thus rendering SRRAT
useless. Some viruses purposely encrypt the parameters when calling an API, SRRAT
would process these parameters correctly but can produce a false negative since the
encrypted parameters do not match the actual files being manipulated by the virus.
55
Other viruses call the API functions directly by loading the dynamic link library
and acquiring the memory addresses of the API functions needed for the virus to
run. Later in execution the virus passes the parameters to the memory location, this
approach completely avoids the hooks placed by SRRAT and are never detected.
4.2 Kernel Mode Prototype
The second version of SRRAT was created to run in Windows Kernel mode. This
version traced the Zwxx system services provided by the ntdll.dll dynamic link library
which are exported from the Kernel process named ntoskrnl.exe. These are all Kernel
system services and can be called directly by a Kernel process or indirectly by a
user mode process. When a user mode process invokes a user mode API such as
OpenFilethe API function sends the request from user mode to a system service in
Kernel mode, in this case ZwOpenFile. Tracing Kernel mode system services has
three main advantages over tracing user mode API function calls:
• This version allows high probability of identifying SR-replication that may have
been missed by the user mode version. This results from the higher level of
difficulty any process, including viruses, faces in trying to execute and avoid
using Kernel mode system services. It is very difficult to avoid interacting with
the Kernel in some form, thus the probability of detecting SR-replication.
• SRRAT itself has a higher level of protection from virus infection by running
in the Kernel. The Kernel is considered to be privileged access and not every
process including other Kernel processes can have direct access to this privileged
space. This give SRRAT a higher rate of survivability from virus attack and
therefore increases the chances of running longer and detecting SR-replication.
• The form in which Zwxx system services are structured requires two parameters
to be included that represent the file name with path and the file handle. This
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requirements eliminates the need to hook and open or close system services and
also eliminates the need of SRRAT to keep a list of file names and handles. This
reduction in processing allows SRRAT to run faster and with less consumption
of processing time.
To run a process in Kernel mode it must be executed by loading it as a system
service. Two separate programs were created for this purpose, one to load and the
other to unload the service from the operating system. Normally, services do not have
user mode start and stop functions, these were added for convenience. Also SRRAT
in this version was purposely created as a rootkit [58, 25] to include some techniques
allowing SRRAT to hide from the system and therefore avoid being attacked or in-
fected by a virus. The two techniques used for this purpose was: 1. the system service
was hidden from the operating system, the name of the service would not show as
currently running by any application in Windows and 2. the configuration file used
by the service was redirected to a different part of the operating system thus hiding
it as well. These are only basic hiding techniques but in fact are very useful. They
allow SRRAT to run on the system as an invisible process which puts SRRAT on
the same level playing field as some advance viruses which is necessary for any virus
detector to run effectively and successfully.
Hooking system services has a different implementation than hooking Win32 API
function calls but the underlying theory is the same. In the Kernel all the system
services including the Zwxx services are exported by their memory location to a ta-
ble called the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT). When a request for a service
comes in from user mode, the specific request is located in the SSDT and the operat-
ing system carries out the service. Similarly to hooking Win32 API function calls, this
version of SRRAT had a list of redefined system services, when SRRAT was loaded
it would overwrite in the SSDT the memory location of the standard system services
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Kernel System Service Read/Write operation
NTSTATUS ZwCreateSection()
OUT PHANDLE SectionHandle,
IN ACCESS MASK DesiredAccess,
IN HANDLE FileHandle OPTIONAL); read(FileHandle, SectionHandle)
NTSTATUS ZwReadFile(
IN HANDLE FileHandle,
OUT PVOID Buffer,
IN ULONG Length,
IN PULONG Key OPTIONAL); read(FileHandle, Buffer)
NTSTATUS ZwMapViewOfSection()
IN HANDLE SectionHandle,
IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,
IN OUT PVOID BaseAddress,
IN ULONG AllocationType,
IN ULONG Win32Protect); write(SectionHandle, BaseAddress)
NTSTATUS ZwWriteFile(
IN HANDLE FileHandle,
IN PVOID Buffer,
IN ULONG Length,
IN PULONG Key OPTIONAL); write(Buffer, FileHandle)
Figure 4.5: Mapping of System Services used in Kernel Version SRRAT
with my redefined versions and thus the requests would be redirected to SRRAT and
its redefined versions, this is how SRRAT hooked the needed Zwxx system services,
which are listed in Figure 4.5. The following is a description of the implementation
of the components of SRRAT in Kernel mode.
4.2.1 Implementation
Overall implementation in this version of SRRAT was much easier than the user
mode version for both the ACP and the SRD. HookAPI was implemented by modi-
fying the memory address of standard system services with my redefined versions in
the SSDT. Since there is only one SSDT for the entire operating system, the actual
hooking only had to occur by SRRAT once as opposed to the user mode version where
hooking occurred once for each process. The number of system services hooked were
less than those in the user mode version, they primarily were only the Zwxx system
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services that represented a read or write operation. In Kernel mode system services
decompose user mode file operations to basic read and write operations. Most no-
tably the Win32 API function call CopyFile is translated to a call to ZwReadFile
and ZwWriteFile in Kernel mode. This decomposition to simplified services greatly
reduced the implementation of HookAPI.
As was the case in the user mode version of SRRAT, the MapAPI-RW subcompo-
nent was automated as a result of system services hooking techniques. My redefined
system services are executed only when the Kernel receives a request for a specific
system service. As a result when the body of my system service executed I had al-
ready predetermined the service to be a read or write. The services’s body had code
inserted to read the necessary parameters that represented the source and destination
parameters of the service and SRRAT continued to the SRD component of SRRAT.
In this version of the ACP, the API repository had a much smaller list of system
service functions needed to be hooked. This was a key advantage allowing for slightly
less memory usage when SRRAT was operating.
The SRD was implemented in principally the same fashion as in the user mode
of SRRAT. Both the test for SR and the SRT subcomponent has the same basic
code as their user mode version. One difference was the removal of the list of file
names and handles which was needed in the user mode version for the SRD to work
properly. In Kernel mode the system services already provide all the file information
that had to be found by SRD in user mode. This slight reduction in code creates
a faster implementation which is key when dealing with aggressive fast spreading
viruses. The graph store was kept in Kernel memory and the individual graphs were
created, destroyed and accessed in the same manner as the user mode version. When
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a process was found to have exhibited SR-replication it was terminated using the
Kernel system service ZwTerminateProcess.
4.2.2 Limitations
The main limitation with this approach was in its implementation. Kernel mode pro-
gramming is a very complex form of programming with little available documentation
to aide the programmer. Many of the types, structures, functions found in the Kernel
are not documented and using them with some confidence is only based on feedback
from other programmers that have walked the path before. Implementing most of the
code took some researching before being successful. Only with experience can a pro-
grammer become skilled in working with the Kernel. Most of the implementation was
built using already established code heavily modified and questions posted on various
forums provided some answers and partial solutions, the rest was done through trial
and error. Many of the undocumented code used in this version had to be modified
or rewritten to please the build environment into successfully compiling and building
the executable version of SRRAT.
Two main limitations encountered during implementation was: 1. obtaining the
name of the process requesting the system service, which is critical to test for SR,
graph creation and identification and 2. Acquiring enough memory for SRRAT to
effectively run. It was very difficult at first to obtain working code that would produce
a string representing the name of the process. After 4 days of trial and error the name
was finally obtained. The Windows Kernel seemingly runs within a limited memory
space called pools and all kernel processes use this memory pool for their specific
purposes. Allocating and using Kernel memory is a difficult science to understand and
implement. Several setbacks were suffered by SRRAT using too much memory causing
Windows to display a blue error screen, also known as the Blue Screen of Death
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(BSOD), which led to the system crashing and requiring a restart. The main memory
problems came with building the graphs in the SRD which works by implementing a
linked list, each pointer was created with a chunk of kernel memory, it seemed this
process repeated several times caused the system to produce the BSOD. The memory
problem was not solved and this resulted in the implementation creating log files
displaying all of the needed information to detect SR-replication in a given process.
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CHAPTER 5
SELF-REFERENCE DETECTION EXPERIMENTS
A suite of experiments were created to test the theory of SR-replication and
the user and Kernel mode implementation prototypes of SRRAT. The tests were
conducted with viruses drawn from a collection of 445 virus samples. The collection
was built from malware repositories on the Internet [60, 42]. The viruses in the
collection were chosen to be representative of all the major categories of virus types.
The amount of virus samples for each category is listed in Figure 5.1. All the sample
viruses in the collection were scanned using Kaspersky Anti-Virus software [33] to
validate their authenticity, name and classification. The focus of these tests was to
count the total number of correct identifications of viruses plus the total amount of
false negatives and false positives produced by the prototypes. All the tests were
conducted on a desktop computer running Microsoft Windows XP with no anti-virus
software installed. The testing involving viruses were done using Vmware Virtual
Workstation [59], which allows for safe isolation of the viruses from infecting an
actual machine while providing a rich real computer emulation environment.
Figure 5.1: Virus Classification with Total Samples amount
Virus Types Total Samples
Email Worms 110
Network Worms 99
Peer-to-Peer Worms 79
Instant Messaging Worms 6
Win32 Viruses 151
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5.1 Theory Validation
Testing the theory of SR-replication entails inquiring if this is a characteristic that
occurs in multiple viruses across several different virus classifications and can further
be identified in some manner. More importantly, it is pivotal to establish if SR-
replication is a characteristic that does not occur in benign processes, this is one of
my assumptions. Establishing these two points will indicate if SR-replication can
be used to distinguish between viruses and benign processes and at the same time
produce little or no false negatives and false positives.
My approach to test the theory of SR-replication was to execute several viruses
and commonly used applications and operating system processes and have their
Win32 API function calls and Kernel system service requests with source and desti-
nation arguments recorded and analyzed. The program used for this was API SPY 32
[7] which records Win32 API function calls and Process Monitor [55] which records
Kernel system service requests. The benign processes used for testing are listed in
Figures 5.1 and 5.2, these were chosen by logging all processes running on two com-
puters on a 5 day span, the processes executed the most were chosen for testing. The
viruses chosen for this test were randomly selected from the collection of 500 assuring
that each category was represented in this test set. The 284 viruses used for testing
are listed in Figure 5.2 and 5.2.
5.2 User Mode Prototype
In testing the user mode implementation prototype of SRRAT three criteria need
to be analyzed, they are: false positive production, false negative production and
usability as a real time monitor and detector. To test for false negative production
a test set of viruses were executed one by one in the virtual machine software with
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AcroRd32.exe netbeans.exe
AcroRd32Info.exe OUTLOOK.EXE
Ad-Aware.exe pa.exe
AlbumDB2.exe palaunch.exe
AsusProb.exe pastatus.exe
bibtex.exe pdflatex.exe
CFD.exe PHOTOED.EXE
csrss.exe POWERPNT.EXE
Deskup.exe procexp.exe
devenv.exe Procmon.exe
emule.exe rundll32.exe
ErrorKiller.exe services.exe
EXCEL.EXE Skype.exe
Explorer.EXE sol.exe
firefox.exe sqlservr.exe
Figure 5.2: Theory Validation Test Benign Processes - 1
SRRAT running. False positive production was tested together with usability as a
real time monitor and detector by running SRRAT on two actual computer desktops
for three days under normal computer use. Both computers had full Internet access
and carry heavy use of several popular desktop applications plus Internet programs.
Installations of new software and updates to already existing software were purposely
done during the testing period as well. Anti-virus software was present and running on
both computers during testing. The viruses were chosen by using those that showed
use of Win32 API function calls during their execution as recorded by the API SPY
32 log files. This resulted in a set of 66 viruses listed in Figure 5.3.
5.3 Kernel Mode Prototype
The Kernel Mode Prototype of SRRAT was tested using the same three criteria as that
used for the user mode prototype: false positive production, false negative production
and usability as a real time monitor and detector. Testing false positive production
was conducted jointly with usability as a real time monitor and detector by executing
SRRAT on two actual computer desktops for three days under normal computer use.
The two computers had full Internet access and experience heavy daily use of many
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FrameworkService.exe svchost.exe
gbk2uni.exe symlcsvc.exe
GoogleEarth.exe SyncBackSE.exe
HWN.exe System
IEXPLORE.EXE TEXCNTR.EXE
iexplore.exe TexFriend.exe
java.exe tomcat5.exe
LimeWire.exe verclsid.exe
MATLAB.exe WCESCOMM.EXE
Mcshield.exe WinEdt.exe
MemoryManagement.vshost.exe winlogon.exe
MSACCESS.EXE winmine.exe
mscorsvw.exe WinRAR.exe
msnmsgr.exe WINWORD.EXE
naPrdMgr.exe wmiprvse.exe
nbexec.exe wuauclt.exe
Figure 5.3: Theory Validation Test Benign Processes - 2
popular Internet and desktop applications. New software installations and updates
to already existing software were purposely done during the testing period as well.
Anti-virus software was running on both computers during testing. Testing for false
negative production was done by executing a test set of viruses one at a time in the
virtual machine software with SRRAT running. The viruses were chosen by using
those that showed use of Kernel system services during their execution as recorded
by the Process Monitor log files. This resulted in a set of 367 viruses listed in Figures
5.3, 5.3, 5.3 and 5.3.
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Email Peer to Peer Network Win32
Worms Worms Worms Viruses
Abotus Abuva 3DStars Aidlot
Actem Adil CodeGreen.a Andras.7300
Agist.a Alcan.a Cycle.a Apathy.5378
Alanis AntiFizz Ezio.a Apoc.a
Aliz Aplich Francette.a Arch.a
Altice Apsiv Francette.b Aris
Amus.a Aritim Francette.c Artelad.2173
Anarch Ariver Francette.d Bacros.a
Android Blaxe Francette.e Banaw.2157
Anel Cabby Francette.g Barum.1536
Animan Cake Hiberium.b Basket.a
Anpir.a Carfin Maslan.a Bayan.a
Antiax Cassidy Maslan.b BCB.a
Antites Cayen.a Mytob.q Bee
Aplore Cocker Protoride.aa Beef.2110
Apost Compatex Protoride.ai Bender.1363
Assarm Compux.a Protoride.al Bika.1906
Atirus Cozit Protoride.ar Blateroz
Avoner Dafly.b Protoride.b Bluback.1376
Babuin Dani Protoride.bk Blueballs.4117
BabyBear Delf.a Protoride.e Bogus.4096
Badass Druagz Protoride.f Bondage.968.a
Badtrans.a Agobot.a Afire.b Cabanas.e
Bagle.a Agobot.b Afire.c DarkSide.1371
Bagle.j Agobot.c Afire.d Elkern.a
Bagle.k Agobot.d Bozori.b Enumiacs-6656
Bagle.m Backterra.a Bozori.e Levi-2961
Bagle.n Banuris.a Bozori.j Mental
Bagle.o Bereb.a Dabber.a Mental-10000
Bandet.a Erdam Protoride.g Butter
Banza Flocker Raleka.b CabInfector
Bater.a Franvir Rega.a Cecile
Benny Furby Salie.a Civut.a
Bimoco.a Gagse SdBoter.a Cloz.a
Black Gotorm SdBoter.b Cmay.1222
Blare Grompo SdBoter.c Cornad
Blitzy Halfint SdBoter.g Crosser
Bonorm Huntox SdBoter.k Delfer.a
Figure 5.4: Theory Validation Test Viruses - 1
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Email Peer to Peer Network Win32
Worms Worms Worms Viruses
Bormex Ident Shelp.a Devir
Borzella Insta.a Spoder.a Dictator.2304
Botter.a Inter Stap.b Dislex
Bumper Irkaz Stap.e Gipiras.a
Burnox Kabak.a Stap.f Hezhi
Calil Kamadina Syner.a Jlok
Calposa Kamafe Webdav.a Kenfa.a
Carfrin Kanyak.a Welchia.a Netlip
Cervivec Kapucen.b Welchia.b Niya.a
CWS.a Kazeus Welchia.c Porad.a
Dumaru.r Bereb.b Dabber.b Neshta.a
Eyeveg.m Gedza.b Dabber.c Parite.a
Happy Kenfo Welchia.e Sinco
Klez.a Gedza.c Domwoot.c Parite-b
Klez.e Habaku.b Doomjuice.b Seppuku.6834
Klez.i Kifie.a Kidala.a Small.a
Merkur.b Kifie.c Kidala.b Small.b
Mimail.j Kifie.f Lebreat.a Tapan-3882
Mydoom.ax Niklas.b Muma.b Thorin.11932
Mydoom.b Niklas.c Muma.c Thorin.b
Plexus.a Opex.a Opasoft.a Thorin.c
Sircam.a Polip.a Padobot.m Xorala
Sircam.d Zaka.a Sasser.b Younga.4434
Sober.a Zaka.f Theals.c ZMist
Sober.f Zaka.m Vesser.a ZPerm.b
Yoxec Kevor Xatch.a Spreder
Zar.a Kovirz Zan Sugin
Zhangpo Krepper Zusha.a TeddyBear
Zircon Lamerx Zusha.b VChain
Zoek Lemb.b Zusha.c Watcher.a
Zoher Vagas.a Zusha.e Zevity
Zush Walrain Zusha.f Zorg.a
Zwur.a Weakas Zusha.h Zori.a
Figure 5.5: Theory Validation Test Viruses - 2
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Email-Worm.Win32.Alanis Net-Worm.Win32.Webdav.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Android Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Anpir.a Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.b
Email-Worm.Win32.Antiax Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.c
Email-Worm.Win32.Apost Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.e
Email-Worm.Win32.Asid.a Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.f
Email-Worm.Win32.Bandet.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Bater.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.b
Email-Worm.Win32.Benny P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.c
Email-Worm.Win32.Bimoco.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.d
Email-Worm.Win32.Bormex P2P-Worm.Win32.Aplich
Email-Worm.Win32.Borzella P2P-Worm.Win32.Blaxe
Email-Worm.Win32.Botter.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Cassidy
Email-Worm.Win32.Burnox P2P-Worm.Win32.Compux.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Calposa P2P-Worm.Win32.Delf.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Canbis.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Erdam
Email-Worm.Win32.Happy P2P-Worm.Win32.Flocker.01
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.b P2P-Worm.Win32.Gagse
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.c P2P-Worm.Win32.Gedza.c
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.d P2P-Worm.Win32.Irkaz
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.e P2P-Worm.Win32.Kanyak.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.f P2P-Worm.Win32.Kapucen.b
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.g P2P-Worm.Win32.Weakas
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.i Virus.Win32.Arch.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.j Virus.Win32.BCB.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Sircam.d Virus.Win32.Bee
Net-Worm.Win32.Doomran Virus.Win32.Canbis.a
Net-Worm.Win32.Ezio.a Virus.Win32.Jlok
Net-Worm.Win32.Maslan.b Virus.Win32.Redemption
Net-Worm.Win32.Nimda Virus.Win32.Small.c
Net-Worm.Win32.Rega.a Virus.Win32.Spreder
Net-Worm.Win32.Sasser.b Virus.Win32.Watcher.a
Net-Worm.Win32.Syner.a Virus.Win32.Zori.a
Figure 5.6: Test Viruses for User implementation of SRRAT
V.W32.Zevity V.W32.ZMist V.W32.Zori.a
V.W32.ZPerm.b V.W32.ZPerm.b2 V.Win9x.CIH
V.Win9x.DarkSide.1371 V.Win9x.Sledge.735.b V.Win9x.Small.140
Worm.VB-16
Figure 5.7: Test Viruses for Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 1
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EW.3DStars EW.W32.Bormex EW.W32.NSky.d
EW.VBS.Homepage EW.W32.Borzella EW.W32.NSky.q
EW.VBS.Loveletter.A EW.W32.Botter.a EW.W32.Plexus-a
EW.W32.Actem EW.W32.Bumper.a EW.W32.Roach.b
EW.W32.Agist.a EW.W32.Burnox EW.W32.Sircam.a
EW.W32.Alanis EW.W32.Antiman EW.W32.Sircam.d
EW.W32.Amus.a EW.W32.Calposa EW.W32.Sober.a
EW.W32.Anarch EW.W32.Canbis.a EW.W32.Sober.f
EW.W32.Android EW.W32.Carfrin EW.W32.Sober.y
EW.W32.Anel EW.W32.Cervivec EW.W32.Xanax
EW.W32.Animan EW.W32.CWS.a EW.W32.Zafi.b
EW.W32.Anpir.a EW.W32.Doombot.b EW.W32.Zafi.d
EW.W32.Antiax EW.W32.Dumaru.a EW.W32.Zar.a
EW.W32.Antites EW.W32.Dumaru.c EW.W32.Zhangpo
EW.W32.Aplore EW.W32.Dumaru.m EW.W32.Zush
EW.W32.Apost EW.W32.Dumaru.r IM-Worm.W32.Bropia.aj
EW.W32.Appflet.a EW.W32.Eyeveg.m IM-Worm.W32.Aimes-b
EW.W32.Babuin.a EW.W32.Klez.a NW.W32.AllocUp-b
EW.W32.BabyBear.a EW.W32.Klez.b NW.W32.Afire.c
EW.W32.Baconex EW.W32.Klez.c NW.W32.Afire.d
EW.W32.Bagle.fj EW.W32.Klez.d NW.W32.BlueCode
EW.W32.Bagle.fk EW.W32.Klez.e NW.W32.Bobic.k
EW.W32.Bagle.h EW.W32.Klez.f NW.W32.Bozori.b
EW.W32.Bagle.i EW.W32.Klez.g NW.W32.Bozori.e
EW.W32.Bagle.j EW.W32.Klez.i NW.W32.Bozori.j
EW.W32.Bagle.k EW.W32.Klez.j NW.W32.CodeGreen.a
EW.W32.Bagle.m EW.W32.LovGate.g NW.W32.CodeRed
EW.W32.Bagle.n EW.W32.Nyxem NW.W32.Cycle.a
EW.W32.Bagle.o EW.W32.Merkur.b NW.W32.Dipnet.f
EW.W32.Bagle.q EW.W32.Mimail.j NW.W32.Dabber.b
EW.W32.Bandet.a EW.W32.Mydoom.ax NW.W32.Dabber.c
EW.W32.Banza EW.W32.Mydoom.b NW.W32.Daper.a
EW.W32.Bater.a EW.W32.Mydoom.e NW.W32.Domwoot.c
EW.W32.Benny EW.W32.Mydoom.l NW.W32.Doomjuice.b
EW.W32.Bimoco.a EW.W32.Mydoom.m NW.W32.Doomjuice.d
EW.W32.Blare EW.W32.Mydoom.q NW.W32.Doomran
EW.W32.Blitzy EW.W32.NSky NW.W32.Ezio.a
EW.W32.Bonorm EW.W32.NSky.b NW.W32.Francette.a
EW.W32.Asid.a EW.W32.Happy EW.W32.Klez
EW.W32.Atirus V.W32.Xorala V.W32.Xorala.b
Figure 5.8: Test Viruses for Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 2
69
NW.W32.Francette.b NW.W32.SdBoter.k P2PW.W32.Cabby
NW.W32.Francette.c NW.W32.Shelp.a P2PW.W32.Cake
NW.W32.Francette.d NW.W32.Spoder.a P2PW.W32.Carfin
NW.W32.Francette.e NW.W32.Stap.b P2PW.W32.Cassidy
NW.W32.Francette.g NW.W32.Stap.e P2PW.W32.Cayen.a
NW.W32.Hiberium.b NW.W32.Stap.f P2PW.W32.Cocker
NW.W32.Incef.a NW.W32.Syner.a P2PW.W32.Compatex
NW.W32.Incef.b NW.W32.Theals.b P2PW.W32.Compux.a
NW.W32.Kidala.a NW.W32.Theals.c P2PW.W32.Cozit
NW.W32.Kidala.b NW.W32.Vesser.a P2PW.W32.Dafly.b
NW.W32.Lebreat.a NW.W32.Webdav.a P2PW.W32.Dani
NW.W32.Lebreat.b NW.W32.Welchia.a P2PW.W32.Darby.b
NW.W32.Lebreat.d NW.W32.Welchia.b P2PW.W32.Darby.c
NW.W32.Lebreat.m NW.W32.Welchia.c P2PW.W32.Delf.a
NW.W32.Muma.c NW.W32.Welchia.e P2PW.W32.Disager
NW.W32.Maslan.b NW.W32.Xatch.a P2PW.W32.Druagz
NW.W32.Muma.b NW.W32.Zan P2PW.W32.Erdam
NW.W32.Muma.c NW.W32.Zusha.a P2PW.W32.Flocker.01
NW.W32.Mytob.q NW.W32.Zusha.b P2PW.W32.Franvir
NW.W32.Nimda NW.W32.Zusha.c P2PW.W32.Furby
NW.W32.OpasSoft.a.pac NW.W32.Zusha.e P2PW.W32.Gagse
NW.W32.Padobot.m NW.W32.Zusha.f P2PW.W32.Gedza.b
NW.W32.Protoride.aa P2PW.W32.Abuva P2PW.W32.Gedza.c
NW.W32.Protoride.ai P2PW.W32.Adil P2PW.W32.Gotorm
NW.W32.Protoride.al P2PW.W32.Agobot.a P2PW.W32.Grompo
NW.W32.Protoride.ar P2PW.W32.Agobot.b P2PW.W32.Habaku.a
NW.W32.Protoride.b P2PW.W32.Agobot.c P2PW.W32.Habku.b
NW.W32.Protoride.bk P2PW.W32.Agobot.d P2PW.W32.Halfint
NW.W32.Protoride.e P2PW.W32.Alcan.a P2PW.W32.Huntox
NW.W32.Protoride.f P2PW.W32.AntiFizz P2PW.W32.Ident
NW.W32.Protoride.g P2PW.W32.Aplich P2PW.W32.Ihit.a
NW.W32.Raleka.b P2PW.W32.Apsiv P2PW.W32.Insta.a
NW.W32.Rega.a P2PW.W32.Aritim P2PW.W32.Inter
NW.W32.Salie.a P2PW.W32.Ariver P2PW.W32.Irkaz
NW.W32.Sasser.b P2PW.W32.Backterra.a P2PW.W32.Kabak.a
NW.W32.Sasser.d P2PW.W32.Banuris.a P2PW.W32.Kamadina
NW.W32.SdBoter.a P2PW.W32.Benjamin.a.exe P2PW.W32.Kamafe
NW.W32.SdBoter.b P2PW.W32.Bereb.a P2PW.W32.Kanyak.a
NW.W32.SdBoter.c P2PW.W32.Bereb.b P2PW.W32.Kapucen.b
NW.W32.SdBoter.g P2PW.W32.Blaxe P2PW.W32.Kazeus
Figure 5.9: Test Viruses for Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 3
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P2PW.W32.Kenfo V.W32.Arch.a V.W32.Gipiras.a
P2PW.W32.Kevor V.W32.Aris V.W32.Gpcode.ac
P2PW.W32.Kifie.a V.W32.Artelad.2173 V.W32.Halen.2618
P2PW.W32.Kifie.c V.W32.Bacros.a V.W32.Hezhi
P2PW.W32.Kifie.f V.W32.Banaw.2157 V.W32.Jlok
P2PW.W32.Lamerx V.W32.Barum.1536 V.W32.Kenfa.a
P2PW.W32.Lemb.b V.W32.Basket.a V.W32.Levi.2961
P2PW.W32.Mantas.a V.W32.Bayan.a V.W32.Mental
P2PW.W32.Niklas.a V.W32.BCB.a V.W32.Mental.10000
P2PW.W32.Niklas.b V.W32.Bee V.W32.Mental.10472
P2PW.W32.Niklas.c V.W32.Beef.2110 V.W32.Neshta.a
P2PW.W32.Opex.a V.W32.Bender.1363 V.W32.Nlip
P2PW.W32.Polipos V.W32.Bika.1906 V.W32.Niya.a
P2PW.W32.SpyBot V.W32.Blateroz V.W32.Parite.a
P2PW.W32.Vagas.a V.W32.Bluback.1376 V.W32.Parite.b
P2PW.W32.Walrain V.W32.Blueballs.4117 V.W32.Porad.a
P2PW.W32.Weakas V.W32.Bogus.4096 V.W32.Redemption
P2PW.W32.Zaka.a V.W32.Bondage.968.a V.W32.Savior.1680
P2PW.W32.Zaka.f V.W32.Butter V.W32.Seppuku.6834
P2PW.W32.Zaka.m V.W32.Cabanas.e V.W32.Sinco
V.W32.Cloz.a V.W32.CabInfector V.W32.Small.a
V.W32.Storm-2 V.W32.Canbis.a V.W32.Small.c
V.W32.Civut.a V.W32.Cecile V.W32.Spreder
V.Boot-DOS.Tequila V.W32.Cmay.1222 V.W32.Stream.a
V.DOS.Maltese-Amoeba.2367 V.W32.Cornad V.W32.Stream.b
V.DOS.OneHalf.3666 V.W32.Crosser V.W32.Sugin
V.MSIL.Gastropod V.W32.Crypto V.W32.Tapan.3882
V.MSWord.Blaster V.W32.CTX.6886 V.W32.TeddyBear
V.MSWord.Melissa V.W32.Delfer.a V.W32.Tenga.a
V.VBS.Lucky2 V.W32.Devir V.W32.Teta.a
V.VBS.H V.W32.Dictator.2304 V.W32.Thorin.11932
V.W32.Aidlot V.W32.Dislex V.W32.Thorin.b
V.W32.Aldebaran.8365.a V.W32.Donut V.W32.Thorin.c
V.W32.Aldebaran.8365.b V.W32.Elkern.a V.W32.Thorin.d
V.W32.Andras.7300 V.W32.Emotion.a V.W32.Thorin.e
V.W32.Apathy.5378 V.W32.Enumiacs.6656 V.W32.VChain
V.W32.Apoc.a V.W32.Fosforo V.W32.Voltage.A
V.W32.Apparition V.W32.Ghost.1667 V.W32.Watcher.a
V.W32.Storm V.W32.Yerg.9571 V.W32.Younga.4434
Figure 5.10: Test Viruses for Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 4
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CHAPTER 6
TEST RESULTS: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
Performing the tests was a long and strenuous process. The nature of virus testing
requires several re-installations of the host computer to ensure a clean virus free
environment for the next test. To ensure that each virus was executed in a virus free
environment, the Vmware workstation virtual machine was restored to a clean state
after concluding each test. Assuring a virus free environment for each test was needed
to ensure that a virus was not kept form executing normally as a result of a previous
virus’s infection on the virtual machine. What follows is an analysis and evaluation
of all the test results along with observations and experiences from conducting the
tests.
6.1 Theory Validation
Conducting this test took approximately 4 days to complete. The benign process
testing was completed in one day and the balance of days was taken by the virus
testing. The test results for the benign processes are presented in Figure 6.1. The
first and fourth columns are the names of each benign process tested, the second
and fifth columns are the results of testing for SR, the third and sixth columns are
the test results for SR-replication with Y meaning yes and N meaning No. When
testing commenced I decided to also record any occurrence of SR. My reasoning for
this was if a benign process was an SR process and did not attempt SR-replication
during testing, the possibility of attempting SR-replication could still occur under
different execution conditions. Therefore I considered an SR benign process as being
a potential false positive assuming the correct execution conditions were in place for
SR-replication to occur. The test results show that all 62 benign process not only
did not attempt SR-replication but none even attempted SR. The result is the whole
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test set can be classified as non-SR benign processes based on the test results. Not
finding any SR-replication did not surprise me as this characteristic not being found
in benign processes is one of my main assumptions in this research. I was surprised
though that none of the processes attempted SR. As each process was executed I
interacted with them in as many typical user ways as possible to afford maximum
possibility to the process to exhibit different forms of behavior. Finding none of these
processes attempted SR-replication and SR supports my assumption that SR can
be used to distinguish between viral and non-viral processes. Furthermore the lack
of SR reenforces my assumption by showing that not only do benign processes not
attempt SR-replication but they may not even read themselves, thus not be an SR
process, in any way during their execution. This further distinguishes benign from
viral based on SR-replication characteristic and reduces the chances of false positive
production.
All 284 viruses were tested one by one in the virtual machine for the attempt
of SR-replication. The virtual machine was reset to a clean virus free state before
each test was conducted. A summary of the virus results are in Figures 6.1. The
full test results are in Figures 6.1, 6.1, 6.1 and 6.1. Analyzing the results it becomes
clear that a majority of the viruses did in fact show SR-replication with the excep-
tion of the Win32 Virus class. For that class the majority, 58 viruses, did not show
SR-replication. The viruses that did not show SR-replication could be the result of
advanced anti-detection techniques. Some viruses have the capacity to detect running
processes that may be used to terminate or erase them, if they detect such a process
they will behave as a benign process and do nothing exhibiting virus like behavior,
this of course includes replication. Another reason for these viruses not showing SR-
replication is they may have not found the right conditions to replicate. Win32 viruses
tend to infect files that are of a specific format, most notably the Portable Execution
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Benign SR SRR Benign SR SRR
Process Process
AcroRd32.exe N N netbeans.exe N N
AcroRd32Info.exe N N OUTLOOK.EXE N N
Ad-Aware.exe N N pa.exe N N
AlbumDB2.exe N N palaunch.exe N N
AsusProb.exe N N pastatus.exe N N
bibtex.exe N N pdflatex.exe N N
CFD.exe N N PHOTOED.EXE N N
csrss.exe N N POWERPNT.EXE N N
Deskup.exe N N procexp.exe N N
devenv.exe N N Procmon.exe N N
emule.exe N N rundll32.exe N N
ErrorKiller.exe N N services.exe N N
EXCEL.EXE N N Skype.exe N N
Explorer.EXE N N sol.exe N N
firefox.exe N N sqlservr.exe N N
FrameworkService.exe N N svchost.exe N N
gbk2uni.exe N N symlcsvc.exe N N
GoogleEarth.exe N N SyncBackSE.exe N N
HWN.exe N N System N N
IEXPLORE.EXE N N TEXCNTR.EXE N N
iexplore.exe N N TexFriend.exe N N
java.exe N N tomcat5.exe N N
LimeWire.exe N N verclsid.exe N N
MATLAB.exe N N WCESCOMM.EXE N N
Mcshield.exe N N WinEdt.exe N N
MemoryManagement.vshost.exe N N winlogon.exe N N
MSACCESS.EXE N N winmine.exe N N
mscorsvw.exe N N WinRAR.exe N N
msnmsgr.exe N N WINWORD.EXE N N
naPrdMgr.exe N N wmiprvse.exe N N
nbexec.exe N N wuauclt.exe N N
Figure 6.1: Theory Validation Test Results Benign Processes
74
Email Peer-to-Peer Network Win32
Worms Worms Worms Viruses
SR-replication 43 47 45 13
No SRreplication 28 24 26 58
Figure 6.2: Summary Results Theory Validation Virus Test
(PE) format. It is possible these viruses searched for victim files and simply did not
find any and thus could not replicated. A second interesting observation from the
results is where the SR-replication occurred. Of the viruses that did replicate, the
overwhelming majority did so in Kernel mode and a smaller amount replicated in user
mode. Only three viruses replicated in both user and Kernel mode. The implication
of the majority of these viruses replicating in Kernel is they do this purposely to
attempt detection avoidance. By executing in Kernel mode they have the capacity to
run below or at the same level as virus detectors thus allowing them more leeway to
hide and avoid detection. Just considering only the static analysis, the viruses that
did not show SR-replication are false negatives. It is however difficult to say if they
really could be false negatives for the reasons stated here, it is possible they could be
detected with the proper virus detector in place.
Overall the theory validation testing results strongly support my assumption that
SR-replication can distinguish between viruses and benign processes. The key to
this conclusion is the fact that no false positives occurred and several true positives
occurred. If false positives had occurred then one can conclude that SR-replication
is a characteristic generally occurring in any process. The lack of SR-replication and
SR itself in the benign processes suggests the opposite, that SR-replication may in
fact be a characteristic unique to viruses and not occurring in benign processes.
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Email SRR API Kernel Peer to Peer SRR API Kernel
Worms Attempts Call Service Worms Attempts Call Service
Abotus 0 N N Abuva 0 N N
Actem 0 N N Adil 3 Y Y
Agist.a 1 N Y Alcan.a 1 N Y
Alanis 7 N Y AntiFizz 1 N Y
Aliz 0 N N Aplich 1 N Y
Altice 0 N N Apsiv 0 N N
Amus.a 10 N Y Aritim 1 N Y
Anarch 1 N Y Ariver 1 N Y
Android 1 Y N Blaxe 6 N Y
Anel 0 N N Cabby 1 N Y
Animan 1 N Y Cake 0 N N
Anpir.a 4 Y N Carfin 0 N N
Antiax 1 Y N Cassidy 19 Y N
Antites 0 N N Cayen.a 0 N N
Aplore 2 N Y Cocker 61 N Y
Apost 1 N Y Compatex 6 N Y
Assarm 1 Y N Compux.a 36 Y Y
Atirus 1 N Y Cozit 2 N Y
Avoner 0 N N Dafly.b 0 N N
Babuin 1 N Y Dani 0 N N
BabyBear 0 N N Delf.a 1 Y N
Badass 0 N N Druagz 1 N Y
Badtrans.a 0 N N Agobot.a 1 Y N
Bagle.a 1 N Y Agobot.b 1 Y N
Bagle.j 1 N Y Agobot.c 1 Y N
Bagle.k 1 N Y Agobot.d 1 Y N
Bagle.m 1 N Y Backterra.a 0 N N
Bagle.n 1 N Y Banuris.a 217 N Y
Bagle.o 1 N Y Bereb.a 474 N Y
Bandet.a 2 Y N Erdam 1 Y N
Banza 0 N N Flocker 1 Y N
Bater.a 1 Y N Franvir 0 N N
Benny 1 N Y Furby 0 N N
Bimoco.a 1 Y N Gagse 257 N Y
Black 0 N N Gotorm 1 N Y
Blare 0 N N Grompo 1 N Y
Blitzy 0 N N Halfint 0 N N
Bonorm 0 N N Huntox 0 N N
Figure 6.3: Theory Validation Test Results Viruses - 1
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Email SRR API Kernel Peer to Peer SRR API Kernel
Worms Attempts Call Service Worms Attempts Call Service
Bormex 0 N N Ident 0 N N
Borzella 1 Y N Insta.a 7 N Y
Botter.a 1 N Y Inter 1 N Y
Bumper 0 N N Irkaz 2 Y N
Burnox 30 N Y Kabak.a 0 N N
Calil 0 N N Kamadina 0 N N
Calposa 8 N Y Kamafe 0 N N
Carfrin 1 N Y Kanyak.a 1 Y N
Cervivec 1 N Y Kapucen.b 1 Y N
CWS.a 0 N N Kazeus 1 N Y
Dumaru.r 3 N Y Bereb.b 481 N Y
Eyeveg.m 1 N Y Gedza.b 0 N N
Happy 0 N Y Kenfo 0 N N
Klez.a 3 Y Y Gedza.c 2 N Y
Klez.e 1 Y N Habaku.b 0 N N
Klez.i 1 Y N Kifie.a 2 N Y
Merkur.b 0 N N Kifie.c 2 N Y
Mimail.j 1 N Y Kifie.f 3 N Y
Mydoom.ax 1 N Y Niklas.b 2 N Y
Mydoom.b 1 N Y Niklas.c 2 N Y
Plexus.a 1 N Y Opex.a 103 N Y
Sircam.a 0 N N Polip.a 0 N N
Sircam.d 1 Y N Zaka.a 1 N Y
Sober.a 2 N Y Zaka.f 1 N Y
Sober.f 3 N Y Zaka.m 1 N Y
Yoxec 0 N N Kevor 0 N N
Zar.a 3 N Y Kovirz 0 N N
Zhangpo 1 N Y Krepper 0 N N
Zircon 0 N N Lamerx 0 N N
Zoek 0 N N Lemb.b 3 N Y
Zoher 0 N N Vagas.a 4 N Y
Zush 0 N N Walrain 30 N Y
Zwur.a 0 N N Weakas 1 Y N
Figure 6.4: Theory Validation Test Results Viruses - 2
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Network SRR API Kernel Win32 SRR API Kernel
Worms Attempts Call Service Viruses Attempts Call Service
3DStars 0 N N Aidlot 0 N N
CodeGreen.a 0 N N Andras.7300 0 N N
Cycle.a 1 N Y Apathy.5378 1 N Y
Ezio.a 1 Y N Apoc.a 0 N N
Francette.a 0 N N Arch.a 1 N Y
Francette.b 0 N N Aris 0 N N
Francette.c 0 N N Artelad.2173 0 N N
Francette.d 0 N N Bacros.a 4 N Y
Francette.e 0 N N Banaw.2157 0 N N
Francette.g 0 N N Barum.1536 0 N N
Hiberium.b 0 N N Basket.a 0 N N
Maslan.a 1 N Y Bayan.a 0 N N
Maslan.b 1 N Y BCB.a 60 N Y
Mytob.q 1 N Y Bee 2 N Y
Protoride.aa 0 N N Beef.2110 0 N N
Protoride.ai 0 N N Bender.1363 0 N N
Protoride.al 0 N N Bika.1906 0 N N
Protoride.ar 0 N N Blateroz 0 N N
Protoride.b 0 N N Bluback.1376 0 N N
Protoride.bk 1 N Y Blueballs.4117 0 N N
Protoride.e 0 N N Bogus.4096 0 N N
Protoride.f 0 N N Bondage.968.a 0 N N
Afire.b 3 N Y Cabanas.e 0 N N
Afire.c 1 N Y DarkSide.1371 0 N N
Afire.d 1 N Y Elkern.a 0 N N
Bozori.b 1 N Y Enumiacs-6656 0 N N
Bozori.e 1 N Y Levi-2961 0 N N
Bozori.j 1 N Y Mental 0 N N
Dabber.a 1 N Y Mental-10000 0 N N
Protoride.g 0 N N Butter 0 N N
Raleka.b 0 N N CabInfector 0 N N
Rega.a 2 Y N Cecile 0 N N
Salie.a 0 N N Civut.a 1 N Y
SdBoter.a 1 N Y Cloz.a 0 N N
SdBoter.b 1 N Y Cmay.1222 0 N N
SdBoter.c 1 N Y Cornad 1 Y N
SdBoter.g 1 N Y Crosser 0 N N
SdBoter.k 1 N Y Delfer.a 0 N N
Figure 6.5: Theory Validation Test Results Viruses - 3
78
Network SRR API Kernel Win32 SRR API Kernel
Worms Attempts Call Service Viruses Attempts Call Service
Shelp.a 0 N N Devir 0 N N
Spoder.a 0 N N Dictator.2304 0 N N
Stap.b 8 N Y Dislex 0 N N
Stap.e 7 N Y Gipiras.a 0 N N
Stap.f 7 N Y Hezhi 0 N N
Syner.a 1 Y N Jlok 2 Y Y
Webdav.a 9 Y N Kenfa.a 0 N N
Welchia.a 1 N Y Netlip 0 N N
Welchia.b 1 N Y Niya.a 0 N N
Welchia.c 1 N Y Porad.a 0 N N
Dabber.b 1 N Y Neshta.a 0 N N
Dabber.c 1 N Y Parite.a 1 N Y
Welchia.e 1 N Y Sinco 0 N N
Domwoot.c 1 N Y Parite-b 1 N Y
Doomjuice.b 1 N Y Seppuku.6834 0 N N
Kidala.a 1 N Y Small.a 0 N N
Kidala.b 1 N Y Small.b 0 N N
Lebreat.a 2 N Y Tapan-3882 0 N N
Muma.b 1 N Y Thorin.11932 0 N N
Muma.c 1 N Y Thorin.b 0 N N
Opasoft.a 0 N N Thorin.c 0 N N
Padobot.m 1 N Y Xorala 0 N N
Sasser.b 1 Y N Younga.4434 0 N N
Theals.c 0 N N ZMist 1 N Y
Vesser.a 0 N N ZPerm.b 0 N N
Xatch.a 0 N N Spreder 0 N N
Zan 0 N N Sugin 0 N N
Zusha.a 1 Y N TeddyBear 0 N N
Zusha.b 1 N Y VChain 0 N N
Zusha.c 1 N Y Watcher.a 1 Y N
Zusha.e 1 N Y Zevity 0 N N
Zusha.f 1 N Y Zorg.a 0 N N
Zusha.h 1 N Y Zori.a 1 Y N
Figure 6.6: Theory Validation Test Results Viruses - 4
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6.2 User Mode Prototype
Testing the user implementation of SRRAT against the 66 test viruses was conducted
in less than a day. The detection of SR-replication for the viruses is listed in Figure
6.2. Out of 66 viruses in the test set 18 were terminated and flagged as attempting to
execute SR-replication. When each of these viruses were terminated by SRRAT, the
virus’s SR-replication graph was created and saved to a text file. The SR-replication
graph for the Alanis email worm is presented in Figure 6.7. The graph shows the
Alanis worm attempted SR-replication by first invokng the Readfile API function
with itself as the source parameter, the function returned the memory address 1568460
pointing to the buffer containing the read portion of the virus, this function call makes
Alanis an SR process for invoking a read general operation using itself as the source
of the read, thus Alanis is reading itself. The virus then called the Writefile Api
function using the memory address 1568460 as the source of the write and the desti-
nation was the file kerneldll32.api. When this function was called SRRAT established
transitivity between kerneldll32.api and gallo.exe which is the virus file itself. This
positive test for transitivity showed Alanis to be attempting SR-replication and was
terminated. SRRAT always terminated these processes before the actual Writefile
function was invoked, this prevented the SR-replication from completing. Further-
more the graph show the read operation was the first operation to occur dealing with
SR, this is noted by the 1 next to the function name, the number 2 next to the write
operation function name indicates this operation was then the second that occurred
dealing with SR. The significance of this numbering is that SRRAT not only ter-
minated Alanis for attempting SR-replication but it terminated Alanis on it’s first
attempt of SR-replication.
I classified the viruses that were not terminated into two groups: those viruses not
hooked by SSRAT listed in Figure 6.2 and those viruses that did not attempt SR-
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Figure 6.7: EW-Win32.Alanis SR-replication graph
replication during testing which are listed in Figure 6.2. Of the remaining 48 viruses
that were not terminated, 15 of them executed and did not attempt SR-replication
by the use of API function calls in a way that was detectable by SRRAT. Some of
these viruses perform SR-replication in Kernel mode and others will only replicate
when certain conditions are met and quite possibly these conditions were not present
in the virtual machine. Interestingly, 5 of these viruses: watcher.a, weakas, rega.a,
delf.a and ezio.a had previously attempted SR-replication during the theory vali-
dation testing. During that testing the SR-replication had been identified by the log
files of API SPY 32. I later concluded that these 5 viruses that should have been
detected were not as a result of the implementation of SRRAT missing some key
functionality which prevented detection from occurring.
Of the 48 viruses not terminated by SRRAT, 33 were not hooked by SRRAT when
execution commenced. SRRAT notifies me through a log file of it’s activities while
it runs. When it hooks a process the action is noted in the log file. When each of
the 33 viruses listed in Figure 6.2 were executed one by one, the SRRAT log file did
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
Email-Worm.Win32.Alanis Y Net-Worm.Win32.Webdav.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Android N Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Anpir.a N Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.b N
Email-Worm.Win32.Antiax N Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.c N
Email-Worm.Win32.Apost Y Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.e Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Asid.a N Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.f Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Bandet.a N P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.a Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Bater.a N P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.b Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Benny N P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.c Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Bimoco.a N P2P-Worm.Win32.Agobot.d Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Bormex N P2P-Worm.Win32.Aplich N
Email-Worm.Win32.Borzella Y P2P-Worm.Win32.Blaxe Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Botter.a N P2P-Worm.Win32.Cassidy Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Burnox Y P2P-Worm.Win32.Compux.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Calposa Y P2P-Worm.Win32.Delf.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Canbis.a N P2P-Worm.Win32.Erdam N
Email-Worm.Win32.Happy N P2P-Worm.Win32.Flocker.01 Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.b N P2P-Worm.Win32.Gagse Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.c N P2P-Worm.Win32.Gedza.c N
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.d N P2P-Worm.Win32.Irkaz N
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.e N P2P-Worm.Win32.Kanyak.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.f N P2P-Worm.Win32.Kapucen.b Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.g N P2P-Worm.Win32.Weakas N
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.i N Virus.Win32.Arch.a N
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.j N Virus.Win32.BCB.a Y
Email-Worm.Win32.Sircam.d N Virus.Win32.Bee N
Net-Worm.Win32.Doomran N Virus.Win32.Canbis.a N
Net-Worm.Win32.Ezio.a N Virus.Win32.Jlok N
Net-Worm.Win32.Maslan.b N Virus.Win32.Redemption Y
Net-Worm.Win32.Nimda N Virus.Win32.Small.c N
Net-Worm.Win32.Rega.a N Virus.Win32.Spreder N
Net-Worm.Win32.Sasser.b N Virus.Win32.Watcher.a N
Net-Worm.Win32.Syner.a N Virus.Win32.Zori.a N
Figure 6.8: Virus Test Results User implementation of SRRAT
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Virus Virus
Name Name
Email-Worm.Win32.Android Email-Worm.Win32.Anpir.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Antiax Email-Worm.Win32.Asid.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Bandet.a Email-Worm.Win32.Bater.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Benny Email-Worm.Win32.Bimoco.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Bormex Email-Worm.Win32.Canbis.a
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.b Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.c
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.d Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.e
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.f Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.g
Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.i Email-Worm.Win32.Klez.j
Email-Worm.Win32.Sircam.d Net-Worm.Win32.Maslan.b
Net-Worm.Win32.Nimda Net-Worm.Win32.Sasser.b
Net-Worm.Win32.Syner.a Net-Worm.Win32.Webdav.a
P2P-Worm.Win32.Compux.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Erdam
P2P-Worm.Win32.Gedza.c P2P-Worm.Win32.Irkaz
P2P-Worm.Win32.Kanyak.a Virus.Win32.Bee
Virus.Win32.Jlok Virus.Win32.Small.c
Virus.Win32.Zori.a
Figure 6.9: Viruses not hooked by User implementation of SRRAT
Virus Virus Virus
Name Name Name
Virus.Win32.Watcher.a Virus.Win32.Spreder Virus.Win32.Canbis.a
Virus.Win32.Arch.a P2P-Worm.Win32.Weakas P2P-Worm.Win32.Delf.a
P2P-Worm.Win32.Aplich Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.c Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.b
Net-Worm.Win32.Zusha.a Net-Worm.Win32.Rega.a Net-Worm.Win32.Ezio.a
Net-Worm.Win32.Doomran Email-Worm.Win32.Happy Email-Worm.Win32.Botter.a
Figure 6.10: Viruses not Exhibiting SR-replication in User Mode SRRAT Testing
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not contain any entry documenting a successful hook of the executing virus. These
viruses executed fully on the system with no monitoring of them being conducted by
SRRAT. Some of these viruses actually run in Kernel mode and are able to bypass
user mode detectors such as SSRAT. But others do show usage of API function calls
in user mode. These were not detected due to lack of functionality in the user mode
implementation of SRRAT.
Testing for false positives occurred together with usability as a real time monitor
by running SRRAT on two desktop computers for three days. During this time the
two computers were used under normal conditions plus some installation programs
were purposely run in an attempt to cause SRRAT to produce a false positive. At
the end of the three days SRRAT did not report a single process as having attempted
SR-replication, no processes were terminated as a result of exhibiting possible virus
behavior which ultimately means that no false positives were produced. The testing
also showed the user mode implementation of SRRAT not to be a very practical real
time monitor and detector. One five occasions one of the computers had to be re-
booted due to very slow operation resulting from SRRAT consuming high amounts of
resources thus starving all the other processes running on the computer. On several
occasions, SRRAT would crash when attempting to hook a process that was running
at the time SRRAT was started. On a few occasions when SRRAT was terminated
it still kept running and the process had to be terminated directly and ungracefully
using Windows system tools. These problems were all implementation related and
despite them no false positives occur and virus detection had been successful in some
cases.
Overall, I feel the testing of the user mode implementation of SRRAT had mixed
results. On the one hand detecting a subset of the test viruses shows that detection of
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SR-replication in user mode is possible. The non-production of false positives further
reenforces the idea that SR-replication is a characteristic unique to viruses. On the
other hand, implementation issues due to lack of programming knowledge within the
Windows environment may have led to some false negative production and a resource
intensive implementation causing many problems that made it not to be the best
choice as a practical tool for real time monitoring and detection of SR-replication
in currently running processes. Only with increased programming experience in this
area can a leaner, more robust and effective implementation tool be built.
6.3 Kernel Mode Prototype
A total of 14 days was need to test the Kernel mode implementation of SRRAT
against the 367 test viruses and false positive testing. To test each virus required 8
days with the balance of days being used for false positive and usability testing. A
summary of the test results is listed in Figure 6.3. As we can see from the summary
the overall testing result showed half of the test viruses to exhibit SR-replication
behavior with the other have not exhibiting this behavior.
Recall the memory problems encountered during creation of the implementation
were not overcome and these results were built from analysis of the log files produced
by the Kernel Mode implementation of SRRAT. Besides the four main categories of
viruses I also added one and two samples of two new categories which were Instant
Messaging viruses and Win32 Worms. These are not major categories of my test set
and they were added just to have at least one sample to make the test set represen-
tative of other virus categories.
Viewing the results by virus category is is clear that SR-replication occured in the
majority of viruses in the categories of: email worms, network worms, peer-to-peer
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worms, instant messaging worms and Win32 worms. The main cause of the 50/50
split in the overall results is directly related to the very high false negative rate pro-
duced by the Win32 viruses category.
Email Peer-to-Peer Network IM Win32 Win32 Total
Worms Worms Worms Worms Worms Viruses Amount
SR-replication 67 50 45 2 1 19 184
No SRreplication 28 28 38 0 0 89 183
True Positve 70% 64% 54% 100% 100% 18% 50%
False Negative 30% 36% 46% 0% 0% 82% 50%
Figure 6.11: Summary Results Kernel Implementation SRRAT Virus Test
The viruses showing SR replication did so in one of two basic forms. The first form
was a simple read and write general operations. This form was not the dominant one
in the log file analysis of the virus executions. A sample of this form is in Figure 6.12.
The second form and by far the most dominant was a sequence of operations that
began with reading a file into memory followed by another reading of that memory
to a new memory location and finally writing the memory to a new file. A sample
of this form is in Figure 6.13. As seen from the test results in Figures 6.1, 6.1, 6.1
and 6.1, several of the viruses that attempted SR-replication did so multiple times,
the same was true in this testing. The log files clearly showed multiple attempts to
perform SR-replication by several of the test viruses.
The Win32 viruses which produced the highest number of false negatives, were
for the most part the same viruses used in the testing in Figure 6.1 and 6.1. In that
testing these viruses showed no attempts whatsoever of SR-replication. In testing
these viruses again with the Kernel implementation of SRRAT those results were
confirmed by the log file analysis. As it turns out by studying the log files, these
viruses either: 1. make a copy of the virus itself into memory one or more times. In
many cases this copy into memory is into the memory space of a currently running
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Figure 6.12: SRRAT Kernel Mode Log File Amus Virus
Figure 6.13: SRRAT Kernel Mode Log File Borzella Virus
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process. or 2. did not attempt to replicate in any fashion at all. This can be the
result of the failure to find a suitable environment or victim file to replicate. Given
that these viruses performed poorly during the theory validation testing it is not at
all surprising those findings would be confirmed here as well.
Excluding the Win32 viruses category, the rest of the false negatives produced in
the other categories result from none of their log files showing any attempt to exe-
cuted SR-replication. In several cases these viruses did copy the virus itself into the
memory of currently running processes. Interestingly there were a few viruses that
never attempted replication at all. These viruses I consider false negatives as well
because their lack of replication can be from the absence of a suitable environment
needed to replicate. These viruses may in fact replicate and may even perform SR-
replication given the environment facilitating this for each virus.
False positive testing along with testing for usability as a real time monitor of
the Kernel implementation of SRRAT was conducted across 4 days. The log files
produced by SRRAT were saved once per hour and were analyzed when the testing
was completed. Analyzing the log files showed no attempts SR-replication by any
of the processes recorded. Furthermore no SR operations were conducted either by
any process. This gives further support to my assumption of SR-replication being a
characteristic unique to viruses. From a usability standpoint this version is very ro-
bust not causing and crashing or slowdown of the system at any point during testing.
Furthermore it was never disabled or terminated by any virus during testing.
Overall I was quite happy with the testing results of the Kernel implementation
of SRRAT. The number of true positives was much higher than those produced by
the user implementation of SRRAT and no false positives occurred. The one disap-
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pointment though not surprising was the high false negative amount of the Win32
viruses category. The Kernel implementation of SRRAT proved to be superior to the
user mode in many aspects. It ran leaner, more robust, never crashed or slowed down
the system at any time and proved capable of detecting far more viruses exhibiting
SR-replication attempts then its user mode counterpart. Given this version is more
capable of true positive detection then the user implementation version along with an
overall 50% false negative production indicates to me this approach may be best used
in conjunction with other known approaches to compensate their detection abilities
with the false negatives produced by this implementation. The complete results of
the virus testing with the Kernel mode version of SRRAT are listed in Figures 6.4,
6.4, 6.4, 6.4 and 6.4.
6.4 Evaluation of Proposed Solution
Analyzing the results of all the testing two conclusions can be made about SR-
replication. First it seems clear that this form of replication is unique to viruses and
not to benign processes. It may therefore be suitable as a characteristic to differen-
tiate between the viruses and benign processes. Second, implementing this theory is
better suited at the lowest possible level of a system to maximize detection capabili-
ties. This is evident from the much larger number of true positives produced by the
kernel mode of SRRAT then the user mode of SRRAT.
The false negative production can be from one of two observations each with its
own unique solution: First the viruses replicate at different levels from those in my
implementations or they are able to avoid detection, this would require better pro-
gramming techniques which is realizable. Second, these viruses may in fact replicate
and my implementations simply lacks some functionality to detect these viruses and
this functionality is not implementable. In this case, the best solution would be to
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compliment this approach with other known approaches with the assumption that
the combination will reduce the false negatives while at the same time maintain or
increase the true positives.
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
EW.3DStars N EW.W32.Bormex N
EW.W32.NSky.d Y EW.VBS.Homepage N
EW.W32.Borzella Y EW.W32.NSky.q N
EW.VBS.Loveletter.A N EW.W32.Botter.a Y
EW.W32.Plexus-a Y EW.W32.Actem N
EW.W32.Bumper.a N EW.W32.Roach.b Y
EW.W32.Agist.a Y EW.W32.Burnox Y
EW.W32.Sircam.a N EW.W32.Alanis N
EW.W32.Antiman Y EW.W32.Sircam.d Y
EW.W32.Amus.a Y EW.W32.Calposa Y
EW.W32.Sober.a N EW.W32.Anarch Y
EW.W32.Canbis.a Y EW.W32.Sober.f N
EW.W32.Android Y EW.W32.Carfrin Y
EW.W32.Sober.y N EW.W32.Anel N
EW.W32.Cervivec Y EW.W32.Xanax Y
EW.W32.Animan Y EW.W32.CWS.a N
EW.W32.Zafi.b Y EW.W32.Anpir.a Y
EW.W32.Doombot.b Y EW.W32.Zafi.d Y
EW.W32.Antiax Y EW.W32.Dumaru.a Y
EW.W32.Zar.a Y EW.W32.Antites N
EW.W32.Dumaru.c Y EW.W32.Zhangpo N
EW.W32.Aplore Y EW.W32.Dumaru.m Y
EW.W32.Zush N EW.W32.Apost Y
EW.W32.Dumaru.r Y IM-Worm.W32.Bropia.aj Y
EW.W32.Appflet.a Y EW.W32.Eyeveg.m Y
IM-Worm.W32.Aimes-b Y EW.W32.Asid.a Y
EW.W32.Happy Y EW.W32.Babuin.a Y
EW.W32.Atirus Y EW.W32.Klez N
EW.W32.Klez.a N NW.W32.AllocUp-b Y
EW.W32.BabyBear.a N EW.W32.Klez.b N
NW.W32.Afire.c Y EW.W32.Baconex Y
EW.W32.Klez.c Y NW.W32.Afire.d N
EW.W32.Bagle.fj Y EW.W32.Klez.d Y
NW.W32.BlueCode N EW.W32.Bagle.fk Y
EW.W32.Klez.e Y NW.W32.Bobic.k Y
EW.W32.Bagle.h Y EW.W32.Klez.f Y
NW.W32.Bozori.b Y EW.W32.Bagle.i Y
EW.W32.Klez.g Y NW.W32.Bozori.e Y
EW.W32.Bagle.j Y EW.W32.Klez.i Y
Figure 6.14: Virus Test Results Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 1
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
NW.W32.Bozori.j Y EW.W32.Bagle.k Y
EW.W32.Klez.j Y NW.W32.CodeGreen.a N
EW.W32.Bagle.m Y EW.W32.LovGate.g Y
NW.W32.CodeRed N EW.W32.Bagle.n Y
EW.W32.Nyxem Y NW.W32.Cycle.a Y
EW.W32.Bagle.o Y EW.W32.Merkur.b N
NW.W32.Dipnet-f Y EW.W32.Bagle.q Y
EW.W32.Mimail.j Y NW.W32.Dabber.b N
EW.W32.Bandet.a Y EW.W32.Mydoom.ax Y
NW.W32.Dabber.c Y EW.W32.Banza N
EW.W32.Mydoom.b N NW.W32.Daper.a N
EW.W32.Bater.a Y EW.W32.Mydoom.e Y
NW.W32.Domwoot.c Y EW.W32.Benny Y
EW.W32.Mydoom.l Y NW.W32.Doomjuice.b Y
EW.W32.Bimoco.a Y EW.W32.Mydoom.m Y
NW.W32.Doomjuice.d Y EW.W32.Blare N
EW.W32.Mydoom.q Y NW.W32.Doomran Y
EW.W32.Blitzy N EW.W32.NSky N
NW.W32.Ezio.a Y EW.W32.Bonorm N
EW.W32.NSky.b Y NW.W32.Francette.a N
NW.W32.Francette.b N NW.W32.SdBoter.k N
P2PW.W32.Cabby Y NW.W32.Francette.c N
NW.W32.Shelp.a N P2PW.W32.Cake N
NW.W32.Francette.d N NW.W32.Spoder.a N
P2PW.W32.Carfin N NW.W32.Francette.e N
NW.W32.Stap.b Y P2PW.W32.Cassidy Y
NW.W32.Francette.g N NW.W32.Stap.e N
P2PW.W32.Cayen.a N NW.W32.Hiberium.b N
NW.W32.Stap.f N P2PW.W32.Cocker Y
NW.W32.Incef.a Y NW.W32.Syner.a Y
P2PW.W32.Compatex Y NW.W32.Incef.b Y
NW.W32.Theals.b N P2PW.W32.Compux.a Y
NW.W32.Kidala.a Y NW.W32.Theals.c N
P2PW.W32.Cozit Y NW.W32.Kidala.b Y
NW.W32.Vesser.a N P2PW.W32.Dafly.b Y
NW.W32.Lebreat.a Y NW.W32.Webdav.a Y
P2PW.W32.Dani N NW.W32.Lebreat.b Y
NW.W32.Welchia.a Y P2PW.W32.Darby.b N
NW.W32.Lebreat.d Y NW.W32.Welchia.b Y
P2PW.W32.Darby.c N NW.W32.Lebreat.m Y
Figure 6.15: Virus Test Results Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 2
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
NW.W32.Welchia.c Y P2PW.W32.Delf.a Y
NW.W32.Muma.c Y NW.W32.Welchia.e Y
P2PW.W32.Disager Y NW.W32.Maslan.b N
NW.W32.Xatch.a N P2PW.W32.Druagz Y
NW.W32.Muma.b Y NW.W32.Zan N
P2PW.W32.Erdam Y NW.W32.Muma.c Y
NW.W32.Zusha.a Y P2PW.W32.Flocker.01 Y
NW.W32.Mytob.q Y NW.W32.Zusha.b Y
P2PW.W32.Franvir N NW.W32.Nimda Y
NW.W32.Zusha.c Y P2PW.W32.Furby N
NW.W32.OpasSoft.a.pac N NW.W32.Zusha.e N
P2PW.W32.Gagse Y NW.W32.Padobot.m Y
NW.W32.Zusha.f N P2PW.W32.Gedza.b N
NW.W32.Protoride.aa N P2PW.W32.Abuva N
P2PW.W32.Gedza.c Y NW.W32.Protoride.ai N
P2PW.W32.Adil Y P2PW.W32.Gotorm Y
NW.W32.Protoride.al N P2PW.W32.Agobot.a Y
P2PW.W32.Grompo Y NW.W32.Protoride.ar N
P2PW.W32.Agobot.b Y P2PW.W32.Habaku.a N
NW.W32.Protoride.b N P2PW.W32.Agobot.c Y
P2PW.W32.Habku.b N NW.W32.Protoride.bk Y
P2PW.W32.Agobot.d Y P2PW.W32.Halfint N
NW.W32.Protoride.e N P2PW.W32.Alcan.a Y
P2PW.W32.Huntox N NW.W32.Protoride.f N
P2PW.W32.AntiFizz Y P2PW.W32.Ident N
NW.W32.Protoride.g N P2PW.W32.Aplich Y
P2PW.W32.Ihit.a N NW.W32.Raleka.b N
P2PW.W32.Apsiv N P2PW.W32.Insta.a N
NW.W32.Rega.a Y P2PW.W32.Aritim Y
P2PW.W32.Inter Y NW.W32.Salie.a N
P2PW.W32.Ariver Y P2PW.W32.Irkaz Y
NW.W32.Sasser.b Y P2PW.W32.Backterra.a N
P2PW.W32.Kabak.a N NW.W32.Sasser.d Y
P2PW.W32.Banuris.a Y P2PW.W32.Kamadina N
NW.W32.SdBoter.a N P2PW.W32.Benjamin.a.exe Y
P2PW.W32.Kamafe N NW.W32.SdBoter.b Y
P2PW.W32.Bereb.a Y P2PW.W32.Kanyak.a Y
NW.W32.SdBoter.c Y P2PW.W32.Bereb.b Y
P2PW.W32.Kapucen.b Y NW.W32.SdBoter.g Y
P2PW.W32.Blaxe Y P2PW.W32.Kazeus Y
Figure 6.16: Virus Test Results Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 3
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
P2PW.W32.Kenfo N V.W32.Arch.a Y
V.W32.Gipiras.a N P2PW.W32.Kevor N
V.W32.Aris N V.W32.Gpcode.ac N
P2PW.W32.Kifie.a N V.W32.Artelad.2173 N
V.W32.Halen.2618 N P2PW.W32.Kifie.c Y
V.W32.Bacros.a Y V.W32.Hezhi N
P2PW.W32.Kifie.f Y V.W32.Banaw.2157 N
V.W32.Jlok Y P2PW.W32.Lamerx N
V.W32.Barum.1536 N V.W32.Kenfa.a N
P2PW.W32.Lemb.b Y V.W32.Basket.a N
V.W32.Levi.2961 N P2PW.W32.Mantas.a Y
V.W32.Bayan.a N V.W32.Mental N
P2PW.W32.Niklas.a Y V.W32.BCB.a Y
V.W32.Mental.10000 N P2PW.W32.Niklas.b Y
V.W32.Bee N V.W32.Mental.10472 N
P2PW.W32.Niklas.c Y V.W32.Beef.2110 N
V.W32.Neshta.a Y P2PW.W32.Opex.a Y
V.W32.Bender.1363 N V.W32.Nlip N
P2PW.W32.Polipos N V.W32.Bika.1906 N
V.W32.Niya.a N P2PW.W32.SpyBot N
V.W32.Blateroz N V.W32.Parite.a Y
P2PW.W32.Vagas.a Y V.W32.Bluback.1376 N
V.W32.Parite.b Y P2PW.W32.Walrain Y
V.W32.Blueballs.4117 N V.W32.Porad.a N
P2PW.W32.Weakas Y V.W32.Bogus.4096 N
V.W32.Redemption N P2PW.W32.Zaka.a Y
V.W32.Bondage.968.a N V.W32.Savior.1680 N
P2PW.W32.Zaka.f Y V.W32.Butter N
V.W32.Seppuku.6834 Y P2PW.W32.Zaka.m Y
V.W32.Cabanas.e N V.W32.Sinco N
V.W32.Small.a N V.W32.CabInfector N
V.W32.Canbis.a Y V.W32.Small.c N
V.W32.Spreder Y V.W32.Cecile N
V.W32.Civut.a N V.W32.Storm N
V.W32.Storm-2 N V.Boot-DOS.Tequila N
V.W32.Cmay.1222 N V.W32.Stream.a N
V.DOS.Maltese-Amoeba.2367 N V.W32.Cornad N
V.W32.Cloz.a N
Figure 6.17: Virus Test Results Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 4
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Virus SRR Virus SRR
Name Detected Name Detected
V.W32.Stream.b N V.DOS.OneHalf.3666 N
V.W32.Crosser N V.W32.Sugin N
V.MSIL.Gastropod N V.W32.Crypto N
V.W32.Tapan.3882 N V.MSWord.Blaster N
V.W32.CTX.6886 N V.W32.TeddyBear N
V.MSWord.Melissa N V.W32.Delfer.a Y
V.W32.Tenga.a Y V.VBS.Lucky2 N
V.W32.Devir N V.W32.Teta.a Y
V.VBS.H Y V.W32.Dictator.2304 N
V.W32.Thorin.11932 N V.W32.Aidlot N
V.W32.Dislex N V.W32.Thorin.b N
V.W32.Aldebaran.8365.a N V.W32.Donut Y
V.W32.Thorin.c N V.W32.Aldebaran.8365.b N
V.W32.Elkern.a N V.W32.Thorin.d N
V.W32.Andras.7300 N V.W32.Emotion.a N
V.W32.Thorin.e N V.W32.Apathy.5378 Y
V.W32.Enumiacs.6656 N V.W32.VChain N
V.W32.Apoc.a N V.W32.Fosforo N
V.W32.Voltage.A N V.W32.Apparition N
V.W32.Ghost.1667 N V.W32.Watcher.a Y
V.W32.Xorala N V.W32.Xorala.b N
V.W32.Yerg.9571 N V.W32.Younga.4434 Y
V.W32.Zevity N V.W32.ZMist N
V.W32.Zori.a Y V.W32.ZPerm.b N
V.W32.ZPerm.b2 N V.Win9x.CIH N
V.Win9x.DarkSide.1371 N V.Win9x.Sledge.735.b N
V.Win9x.Small.140 N Worm.VB-16 Y
Figure 6.18: Virus Test Results Kernel implementation of SRRAT - 5
95
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusions
This dissertation has address the problem of finding a characteristic present in all
viruses that is suitable to detect both known and unknown viruses belonging to dif-
ferent categories and under several execution conditions. The problems of current
virus detection both signature and behavior based are well established in the liter-
ature. This research presents a behavior based approach to virus detection based
on self-reference replication (SR-replication) which is a characteristic assumed to be
unique to viruses and not commonly occurring in benign processes. Using this charac-
teristic a behavior based detection approach was formalized using directed call graphs
to detect the self replication of a virus file to some other preexisting or newly created
file on a system. The approach works without any a priori knowledge of previously
discovered viruses. The approach simply detects attempts by a process to perform
SR-replication. The approach was tested by conducting static analysis of known
viruses and benign processes.
The results showed SR-replication to be occurring in most viruses and in none
of the tested benign processes. Two implementations of the approach were created
and tested. In both cases no false positives were produced. There were false nega-
tives which resulted from the implementations lacking needed functionality to cover
more sophisticated viruses capable of executing and avoiding detection. The over-
all conclusions of this dissertation is twofold: First, SR-replication can be used as
a characteristic to differentiate between viruses and benign processes. Furthermore
SR-replication can detect known and unknown viruses when they execute without
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any a priori knowledge. This ability makes SR-replication well suited to detect newly
released unknown file infecting viruses upon their initial attempts to executed SR-
replication on a system. Second, a real time process monitor and virus detector on
a system can be implemented and is usable using SR-replication as long as the im-
plementation is at a low level of the computer system, for example the in Kernel mode.
A final observation about SR-replication follows: this dissertation has shown the
virus detection abilities of SR-replication to be very good with strong potential but in
its current state, this form of virus detection is not suitable as a stand alone solution
for all forms of viruses detection. From analyzing the test results it is clear that
SR-replication, in its current form, is best used in conjunction with other forms of
virus detection to provide a robust compound solution that is better suited to face
the issues of virus attacks on computer systems with its strongest novel contribution
being the ability to detect newly released not yet analyzed viruses initially attempting
SR-replication on preexisting or newly created files on a computer system.
7.2 Future Work
The approach of SR-replication presented here can be strengthened by expanding it
to detect replication of viruses into memory and not just files. Another key aspect
is to extend this approach to detect SR-replication across a network. Another form
of replication called indirect self-reference replication (ISR-replication) was briefly
discussed. This is a whole new field of replication complimentary to SR-replication.
Creating algorithms to detect ISR-replication will provide an overall more robust
approach to detecting virus replication in general with no a priori knowledge of any
known viruses. This is essential to protect computer systems from future virus at-
tacks. The problems faced during creation of our implementation of SRRAT need to
be addressed with an appropriate solution. Specifically the memory problems found
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in the Kernel implementation of SRRAT need to be solved to provide a complete
implementation that works the same as the user implementation of SRRAT building
directed call graphs to determine if SR-replication has occurred in real time and pro-
vide the functionality of terminating a process when it does exhibit SR-replication.
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